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PRIVACY PRESERVING DATA PUBLISHING
by
ZAOBO HE
Under the Direction of Zhipeng Cai, PhD and Yingshu Li, PhD
ABSTRACT
Recent years have witnessed increasing interest among researchers in protecting indi-
vidual privacy in the big data era, involving social media, genomics, and Internet of Things.
Recent studies have revealed numerous privacy threats and privacy protection methodologies,
that vary across a broad range of applications. To date, however, there exists no powerful
methodologies in addressing challenges from: high-dimension data, high-correlation data and
powerful attackers.
In this dissertation, two critical problems will be investigated: the prospects and some
challenges for elucidating the attack capabilities of attackers in mining individuals private
information; and methodologies that can be used to protect against such inference attacks,
while guaranteeing significant data utility.
First, this dissertation has proposed a series of works regarding inference attacks laying
emphasis on protecting against powerful adversaries with auxiliary information. In the con-
text of genomic data, data dimensions and computation feasibility is highly challenging in
conducting data analysis. This dissertation proved that the proposed attack can effectively
infer the values of the unknown SNPs and traits in linear complexity, which dramatically
improve the computation cost compared with traditional methods with exponential compu-
tation cost.
Second, putting differential privacy guarantee into high-dimension and high-correlation
data remains a challenging problem, due to high-sensitivity, output scalability and signal-to-
noise ratio. Consider there are tens-of-millions of genomes in a human DNA, it is infeasible
for traditional methods to introduce noise to sanitize genomic data. This dissertation has
proposed a series of works and demonstrated that the proposed differentially private method
satisfies differential privacy; moreover, data utility is improved compared with the states of
the arts by largely lowering data sensitivity.
Third, putting privacy guarantee into social data publishing remains a challenging prob-
lem, due to tradeoff requirements between data privacy and utility. This dissertation has
proposed a series of works and demonstrated that the proposed methods can effectively
realize privacy-utility tradeoff in data publishing.
Finally, two future research topics are proposed. The first topic is about Privacy Pre-
serving Data Collection and Processing for Internet of Things. The second topic is to study
Privacy Preserving Big Data Aggregation. They are motivated by the newly proposed data
mining, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity methods.
INDEX WORDS: Inference Attack, Data Sanitization, Differential Privacy, SNP-
Trait Association, Belief Propagation, Probabilistic Graphical
Model
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivations
Consider a social network application that collects user data from social media plat-
forms, for performing business analysis or providing services. Due to privacy concern, the
users do not want to release their sensitive data to third-party social applications, so that
sensitive data is generally sanitized prior to releasing. However, it is possible to mine sensi-
tive information carried in collected data by data mining techniques, to contribute to more
commercial benefit. We proposed that well-designed data sanitization can be developed for
realizing privacy-utility tradeoff in social network data publishing, although powerful attack-
ers are presented with a broad range of auxiliary information to launch inference attacks.
Such sanitization helps users sanitize their data by deleting some attributes, inserting other
attributes, and perturbing some attributes, thereby hiding private information within ran-
domness. Meanwhile, such sanitization should enable applications effectively recover useful
information from sanitized data for data utility concern. Searching a well-designed saniti-
zation method is highly non-trivial as data utility is restricted in sanitization process. Our
works show that this issue can be alleviated by identifying the implicit dependency relation-
ship encoded in data, and incorporating social attribute sanitization and link sanitization
simultaneously, etc.
We looked more generally at using sanitization for preserving privacy. Consider a set
of multi-modal sensory data is collected by mobile devices, which offers great potentials to
promote meaningful services. However, privacy concerns arises from multiple situations as
well: it is possible to collect private information from released data without any permission
directly; furthermore, third party applications can also infer sensitive information contained
in released data using data mining techniques. Given a certain data sanitization method for
2user’s data, what can we claim about the privacy protection it achieves? and what can we
claim about the utility guarantee under certain level of privacy protection? New method-
ologies have been developed that answer these two questions in terms of optimizing utility
with customized privacy. We proposed that these two types of privacy threats should be
identified separately, defined as inherent data privacy and latent data privacy, and construct
data sanitization methodology to optimize the tradeoff between data utility and customized
two types of privacy. Moreover, we proposed to design such sanitization methodologies to
combat against powerful third-party application with broad knowledge and launching opti-
mal inference attacks. The new methodology has been applied to preserve the privacy of
the users of Internet of Things and shown to yield practically useful results. The generality
of this methodology has allowed us to extend privacy guarantees to multi-modal data in
cyber-physical systems.
Consider individuals are using their genomes to learn about their (genetic) predisposi-
tions to diseases. However, once the owner of a genome is identified, he not only damages his
own genomic privacy, but also puts his relatives privacy at risk (for example, form insurance
companies). How do launch inference attacks to predict target phenotypes and genotypes
with known genomes of an owner? How do release individual genomes privately with guar-
anteed genetic service quality? New methodologies have been developed that answer these
two questions.
For the first research issue, we formalize the problem and detail an efficient reconstruc-
tion attack based on graphical models and belief propagation. We proposed that an effective
reconstruction methodology can be built by incorporating SNPs, traits and SNP/trait asso-
ciations (released by GWAS Catalog) on a probability graphical model and running belief
propagation for inference. Our work does consider the magnitude property of SNPs and
empower the inference method on target traits and genotypes in linear complexity. To pro-
tect against such inference attacks, we formalize the genomic privacy and utility metrics of
individuals and develop a data-sanitization method to realize privacy/utility tradeoff.
For the second research issue, the state-of-the-art approach for privacy preserving data
3publishing is differential privacy, which offers powerful privacy guarantee without confining
assumptions about the background knowledge about attackers. However, high-dimensional
data releasing with differential privacy guarantee is highly non-trivial as it requires injecting
huge amount of noise, which would significantly degrade data utility. For genomic data
with tens of million of SNPs (Single Nucleotide Polymorphism), current approaches based
on differential privacy are not effective to handle. To address this problem, we propose
a methodology to approximate the high-dimensional distribution of the original genomic
data with a set of well-chosen low-dimensional distributions; then, noise with differential
privacy guarantee can be injected into them. Finally, synthetic genomes are sampled from
the approximate distribution, which can be proved satisfying differential privacy.
The above problems are briefly introduced in the following three sections. For the
detailed information, please refer to Chapter 3, 4 and 5.
Finally, future research topics are proposed to complete the dissertation. The first topic
is about privacy preserving data collection and processing for IoTs. The second future work
is to study privacy preserving big data aggregation.
1.2 Collective Data-Sanitization for Preventing Sensitive Information Inference
Attacks in Social Networks
Releasing social network data could seriously breach user privacy. User profile and
friendship relationships are inherently private and generally are protected. Unfortunately, it
is possible to predict the sensitive information carried in the released data latently by utilizing
data mining techniques. Therefore, sanitizing network data prior to release is necessary. This
study explore how to lunch an inference attack exploiting social networks with a mixture
of non-sensitive attributes and social relationships. This issue is mapped to a collective
classification problem and a collective inference model is proposed. In this model, an attacker
utilizes user profile and social relationships in a collective manner to predict the sensitive
information of related victims in a released social network dataset. To protect against such
attacks, this study proposes a novel data sanitization method that collectively manipulates
4user profile and friendship relations. The key novel idea lies that in addition to sanitize
friendship relations, the proposed method can take advantages of various data-manipulating
methods. It is shown that on various characteristics social communities, the proposed method
can easily reduce adversary’s prediction accuracy on sensitive information, while resulting
in less accuracy decrease on non-sensitive information.
1.3 Latent-Data Privacy Preserving With Customized Data Utility for Social
Network Data
Social network data can help with obtaining valuable insight into social behaviors and
revealing the underlying benefits. New big data technologies are emerging to make it easier
to discover meaningful social information from market analysis to counterterrorism. Un-
fortunately, both diverse social datasets and big data technologies raise stringent privacy
concerns. Adversaries can launch inference attacks to predict sensitive latent information,
which is unwilling to be published by social users. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between data
benefits and privacy concerns. This study investigates how to optimize the tradeoff between
latent-data privacy and customized data utility. In this study, a data sanitization strategy is
proposed that does not greatly reduce the benefits brought by social network data, while sen-
sitive latent information can still be protected. Even considering powerful adversaries with
optimal inference attacks, the proposed data sanitization strategy can still preserve both da-
ta benefits and social structure, while guaranteeing optimal latent-data privacy. This is the
first work that preserves both data benefits and social structure simultaneously and combats
against powerful adversaries.
1.4 Inference Attacks and Controls on Genotypes and Phenotypes for Individ-
ual Genomic Data
The rapid growth of DNA-sequencing technologies motivates more personalized and
predictive genetic-oriented services, which further attract individuals to increasingly release
their genome information to learn about personalized medicines, disease predispositions,
5genetic compatibilities, etc. Individual genome information is notoriously privacy-sensitive
and highly associated with relatives. In this study, an inference attack algorithm is proposed
to predict target genotypes and phenotypes based on belief propagation in factor graphs.
With this algorithm, an attacker can effectively predict the target genotypes and phenotypes
of target individuals based on genome information shared by individuals or their relatives,
and genotype and phenotype association from genome-wide association study (GWAS). To
address the privacy threats resulted from such inference attacks, this work elaborates the
metrics to evaluate data utility and privacy and then presents a data sanitization method.
The inference attack algorithm and data sanitization method are evaluated based on real
GWAS dataset: Age-related macular degeneration (AMD) case/control dataset. The evalu-
ation results show that the proposed method can effectively defense against genome threats
while guaranteeing data utility.
1.5 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 summarized the relat-
ed literatures. Chapter 3 presents a data-sanitization method to prevent against sensitive
information inference attacks in social networks. Chapter 4 studies latent-data privacy pre-
serving with customized data utility for social network data. Chapter 5 solves the problem
of inference attacks and controls on genotypes and phenotypes for individual genomic data.
Chapter 6 proposes the future works.
6Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 Privacy Threats in Social Network Data Publishing and Protection
Anonymization and De-anonymization. Privacy is typically protected by anonymiza-
tion methods, i.e., removing information regarding name, religion, political view, etc. How-
ever, such network could be de-anonymized by utilizing background knowledge such as refer-
ence network. For example, de-anonymization approaches utilize ‘network mapping’ to map
social nodes from reference networks to anonymized networks.
In [1], the authors propose a community-enhanced de-anonymization approach to re-
identify users, which first partitions the network into communities and then carries out a
two-stage mapping: first mapping communities then the entire network. In [2], the authors
consider a de-anonymization algorithm to re-identify the users in an anonymized social net-
work based on network topology, namely, mapping the anonymous target graph and the ag-
gregated graph from multiple social networks. Comparatively, our works attempt to protect
against inference attacks on sensitive information of users, rather than solely re-identifying
users in an anonymized network. In [3], the authors propose a family of anonymization algo-
rithms and consider the corresponding de-anonymization algorithms. However, their network
model only consists of users and friendship links and the attackers are assumed to re-identify
the users. Clearly, their studied problem is quite different from our works because they do
not consider how to anonymize a network in order to protect against inference attacks on
sensitive attributes. The work in [4] presents a systematic survey for the anonymization
techniques for social network data. The anonymization techniques are mainly categorized
into the clustering-based approaches and the graph modification approaches. Comparatively,
our works take advantage of various techniques to balance privacy and data utility.
7Inference Attacks and Protection Methods. There are many works investigating
how to infer sensitive information of users. In [5], the authors demonstrate that users’
sensitive information can be inferred via detecting communities based on the assumption
that users in a community are more likely share common attributes. Similarly, the work in
[6] indicates that users’ sensitive information can be inferred based on friendship information
and group memberships, and it also shows that disclosure of one user’s hidden attribute
would breach her friends privacy. In [7], the authors develop a Bayes network model to infer
sensitive information based on friendship links. Meanwhile, [7] takes a protection method
that randomly hides friendship links and friends’ attributes. In [8], several link-prediction
and attribute-prediction algorithms are proposed in social-attribute networks. In [9], the
authors employ the big data technologies to predict demographic information of users such
as age and location based on users’ mobile communication patterns. The work in [10] designs
a method to predict sensitive latent information from texts published in social media. The
work in [11] develops a data-sanitization strategy to predict sensitive information which can
harness link and attribute information simultaneously. The work in [11] also evaluates the
effect of removing links, removing attributes and perturbing attributes on protecting sensitive
latent information. Our previous work [12] also studies how to customize the tradeoff data
utility and customized latent-data privacy in classification based applications.
Comparatively, our works study which friendship link(s) and user’ attribute(s) should
be manipulated to protect privacy. Close to our works, [9] studies how to infer users’ de-
mographics (gender and age) depending on users’ daily communication patterns. It novelly
harness both the interaction between sensitive attributes and non-sensitive attributes, and
the interaction among sensitive attributes (such as gender and age). Clearly, their method is
quite different from our works because they do not consider the information from friendship
relations that can be utilized in order to infer sensitive information. Moreover, our works
further study how to protect against such inference attack deriving from collective informa-
tion. Moreover, in [13], the authors consider the inference attacks to infer which shortened
URLs clicked by a user in Twitter, only based on two public available information, twitter
8metadata and the click analytics information.
Note that sanitizing data prior to release is a popular method to realize privacy protec-
tion and utility guarantee [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28]
[29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [28] [39] [40] [41] [42]
Both the work [14] and [15] sanitize data by synthesizing sampled data so that synthe-
sized data satisfy differential privacy. In addition to sensitive latent information, protecting
social network property privacy, like link privacy [16], degree distribution [17], graph privacy
[18] and applications such as influence maximization [19] and privacy preserving content
sharing [43], also attracts much attention. [44] explored how to sanitize data to optimize
the tradeoff between three parties: utility, inherent-data privacy and latent-data privacy. To
protect against inference attacks on social data, [45] proposed a data-sanitization method
that can sanitize social attributes and links collectively with different sanitization methods.
[20] explored the inference attacks on personal traits and genotypes based on belief propa-
gation. Furthermore, a genomic data sanitization method is proposed in [20], by removing
most indicative genomes to traits.
Existing privacy preserving techniques, like differential privacy [46], k-anonymity [47], l-
diversity [48], are generally proposed for preserving inherent-data privacy; however, they are
not competent for protecting latent-data privacy being subject to inference attacks. Inherent-
data privacy is related to sensitive attribute contained in the attribute set released by users
in order to receive data-related services. For example, age and gender are unavoidable data
for health related services yet unwilling to be released by most consumers.
2.2 Genomic Data Privacy Threats and Protection
Probability graph models are widely used in predicting haplotype, genotypes or phe-
notypes in the context of genomic data releasing. Especially, Bayesian networks attract
much attention in mapping the association between phenotypes and genes [49] [50] [51], or
genetic linkage analysis [52] [53]. Factor graphs are also employed for inference attacks on S-
NPs through incorporating linkage disequilibrium to preserve kin-genomic privacy [54]. The
9work in [53] elaborates the applications of gene expression studies and genetic architecture
of disease linkage analysis based on probability graph models. The authors in [54] proposed
a reconstruction model to infer the genotypes of target individuals with released SNPs from
individuals or their relatives, by mapping the linkage disequilibrium of SNPs. The work in
[55] aims to predict the haplotype of individuals with publicly available genotypes and phe-
notypes, as well as lifestyle knowledge of individuals, based on Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) sampling. To lower the large computational burden, the work in [56] introduces a
“pre-phasing” strategy to balance the linkage analysis and computational cost, by estimating
the haplotype statistically first and then impute unknown genotypes into the estimated hap-
lotype in prior stage. The work in [57] reviews differential statistical techniques for genotype
imputation, and explores the aspects that result in diverse imputation performance.
A crucial challenge presented in inference or linkage analysis for genomic data is high
computation complexity. Although previous works have made significant efforts to address
this issue, none of them has incorporated known and unknown genotypes, phenotypes and
background knowledge of attackers together to launch inference attacks. Moreover, none of
them presents effective methods to defense against such inference attacks in the context of
high-dimensional data and complex associations.
In the recent years, inference attacks based on data mining, machina learning and sta-
tistical prediction methods have been investigated in several areas, such as location tracking,
social networks [45] [44], and mobile networks [58] [43]. Differential privacy [59] is widely
adopted in providing formal privacy guarantee through enabling distinguishability for query
results over released data. However, applying differential privacy for protecting genomic
data privacy is non-trivial since massive noises are required due to the high dimension of
genomic data. The work in [60] proposes a privacy preserving data mining technique which
supports analysts to conduct data analysis with accurate results while guarantees analysts
cannot learn which and how many SNPs to consider.
Moreover, some recent works have proved that anonymization is not sufficient to p-
reserve privacy [61] [62] [63]. The work in [61] proves that the released genotypes can be
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de-anonymized with the help of auxiliary information such as known phenotypes. It is shown
in [62] that individual surnames can be identified from individual genome data. Moreover,
the works in [62] claims combining a surname with auxiliary information such as gender, age
or state, the identity of target individual can be triangulated. Moreover, some cryptography
techniques are employed to achieve tradeoff between genomic data privacy and utility [63]
[64]. The work in [54] presents two metrics to evaluate privacy, attacker uncertainty and
incorrectness.
Compared with the previous works, our work proposes an efficient inference model with
low computation complexity by incorporating target unknown variables, known variables and
auxiliary information into a probability graph model. Furthermore, we achieve the tradeoff
between genomic data privacy and utility by introducing the utility and privacy metrics first
and proposing an effective SNP-sanitization method, which can maximize data utility while
protecting genome privacy.
11
Chapter 3
INFERENCE ATTACKS AND COLLECTIVE DATA-SANITIZATION FOR
SOCIAL DATA PUBLISHING
3.1 Introduction
Social networks provide a virtual stage for users to reveal themselves to their own
societies or to the public. For example, Facebook users publish information regarding favorite
books, popular songs, interesting movies, political views, etc. Users of ResearchGate [65],
a professional network for scientists and researchers, publish information regarding research
experiences, publications, academic activities and so on. Besides users, third party users
such as researchers, merchants, advertisers, and even adversaries may benefit from the huge
amount of published data that can be easily and deliberately obtained from social networks
for scientific/commercial purpose or malicious intention. For instance, IMDb [66] may make
use of the data released by Facebook to suggest proper movies and TV programs to target
users. However, the rising privacy concerns restrain the data release scale. Facebook Beacon
[67] is an unsuccessful example that reminds people to release anonymous and incomplete
user data. Therefore, the contradiction between the benefit rendered by data and privacy
concerns drive third party users to mine sensitive information hidden in the released data in
addition to non-sensitive information.
Privacy concerns in social networks can be mainly categorized into two types: inherent-
data privacy and latent-data privacy. Inherent-data privacy is related to sensitive data
contained in the data profile submitted by users in order to receive data-related services.
For example, age and gender are unavoidable data for health related services yet unwilling
to be released by most users. De-anonymization towards anonymous data is an inherent-
data privacy instance. For example, two New York Time journalists used to successfully
identify personal information from the published search logs involving 650,000 users made
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available by AOL. The logs include the information of name, age, sex, location, etc., and
such information is associated with a specific individual. Another well-known example is that
individuals’ medical visits were successfully identified based on the anonymized data made
available by the Group Insurance Commission, and the former governor of Massachusetts was
one of the victims. On the other hand, latent-data privacy is related to unreleased sensitive
information, yet such sensitive information can be inferred from released data or users’ social
relationships. For instance, Jenny does not publish her political opinions online, yet such
information could be inferred by mining her friends’ data as Jenny’s social relationships may
be public. Another illustrative example comes from ABCNews.com [68] and Boston Globe
[69]. They reported that it is possible to determine the sexual orientations of some users by
analyzing a subgraph from Facebook.
In this paper, we focus on latent-data privacy. We assume third party users may collect
anonymous user data from social networks. Some users disclose their sensitive information,
while others do not [70]. However, third party users can carry out de-anonymization actions
and further infer sensitive information of users. We first investigate how to infer sensitive
information hidden in the released data. Then, we propose some effective data sanitization
strategies to prevent information inference attacks. On the other hand, the sanitized data
obtained by these strategies should not reduce the valuable benefit brought by the abundant
data resources, so that non-sensitive information can still be inferred and utilized by third
party users.
To explore how to launch an inference attack by third party users, we employ a typical
inference attack, called collective inference, as a case study. We present a novel imple-
mentation method for collective inference. Collective inference mainly rely on iteratively
propagating current predicting results throughout a network to improve prediction accura-
cy, thus we need to consider how to best predict sensitive information in each iteration.
Previous works primarily utilize the Naive Bayes classifier to infer sensitive information in
each iteration. However, social network data are generally incomplete, inaccurate and un-
certain. Hence, the existing approaches may not obtain a precise learned model and may
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degrade inference performance. Our work does consider the special features of social network
data to investigate collective attacks in diverse large scale social networks.
The previous works for preventing inference attacks mainly have three deficiencies. First,
users’ released data and their friendship information are separately considered, degrading
prediction accuracy possibly. Second, only a single type of manipulation method, such
as filtering, perturbing, and adding, is considered at a time, incurring poor effectiveness
performance. Third, data utility is not taken into full consideration, reducing the benefit
brought by the abundant amount of data. Therefore, the previous works cannot reasonably
balance privacy and data utility. In this work, we propose two strategies to prevent inference
attacks. Our strategies can ensure that third party users cannot obtain necessary information
to accurately predict sensitive information. On the other hand, our strategies can still
promote data utility.
In this work, we focus on two concrete issues: (a) how exactly third party users launch an
inference attack to predict sensitive information of users, and (b) are there effective strategies
to protect against such an attack to achieve a desired privacy-utility tradeoff. Following is
the summary of our contributions and improvements over the previous works:
1. Rather than considering users’ attribute sets and friendship information separately,
we present a novel implementation method for collective inference that can effectively
predict users’ sensitive information, with both attribute sets and friendship information
comprehensively taken into account.
2. To hide sensitive information through manipulating attribute sets, rather than sim-
ply implementing perturbing methods through introducing various types of noises,
we rationally identify the dependency relationship between sensitive information and
non-sensitive information.
3. To hide sensitive information through manipulating friendship information, rather than
simply adding or removing friendship links, we propose a novel concept that enables
us to easily find the most representative links.
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4. We further analyze the relationships between data utility and non-sensitive informa-
tion. The identified relationships then support us to design a collective strategy to
achieve a desired privacy-utility tradeoff. Rather than relying on a signal type of
manipulating method, our collective strategy is able to take advantages of various
manipulating methods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The investigated problem is for-
malized in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 introduces some preliminary knowledge. In Section 3.4,
we investigate the working scenario of inference. Some data sanitization strategies are then
proposed in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6. The evaluation results are presented in Section 4.6.
Section 4.7 concludes the paper.
3.2 Problem Statement
3.2.1 Social Network Model
We now present our network model.
Definition 3.2.1. Social network. A social network is a graph G(V,E,X ) consisting of
user set V , friendship link set E and the set of user attribute sets denoted by X . For any
user ui, uj ∈ V (1 ≤ i, j ≤ |V |), their friendship link ei,j ∈ E also indicates ej,i ∈ E.
Definition 3.2.2. Attribute set. For an arbitrary user ui, its attribute set is denoted by
~Xi ∈ X (1 ≤ i ≤ |V |). Each attribute xj ∈ ~Xi (1 ≤ j ≤ | ~Xi|) is for a certain attribute
category hr ∈ H (1 ≤ r ≤ |H|), where H is the set of all the categories for a social network.
We denote an attribute xj as xj = {hr : l1; ...; lt}, which means xj is for category hr with
value list l1; ...; lt where t ≥ 1.
It is worth mentioning that for a particular category, the user input can be a single
value or multiple values. For example, for category “Favorite movies”, the input can be
“The Terminator”, “Titanic” and “Pianist”. For category “Birthday”, the input should be a
single value. Moreover, there may be categories with no input values for some users, such as
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“Political view” and “Religion view”. In specific applications, certain categories are regarded
as sensitive categories. We use Hs ⊆ H to denote the set of the sensitive categories for a
particular user. Any xj ∈ ~Xi is a sensitive attribute of user ui if xj is for hr ∈ Hs. Following
is an example.
H = {Favorite movies, Favorite books, Religion view,
Political view}
V = {u1 = Jack, u2 = Emily}
~X1 = {x1 = {Favorite movies:Titanic}, x2 = {Favorite books:
Automata; Machine learning}}
~X2 = {x1 = {Favorite movies:Pianist}, x2 = {Political view:
Conservative}}
e1,2 ∈ E, e2,1 ∈ E
In this example, there are four categories as shown in H. There are two user-
s u1 and u2. u1 publishes one favorite movie and two favorite books. Thus, for u1,
Hs = {Religion view, Political view}. u2 publishes her political view, thus for u2, Hs =
{Religion view}. u1 and u2 are friends in the social network.
Each possible attribute value for an arbitrary attribute category hr ∈ Hs can be viewed
as a class label when third party users predict sensitive attribute xj for category hr. For
example, if hr is category “Political view”, we can consider two possible attribute values as
our class labels: “Conservative” and “Liberal”. Class label is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.2.3. Class label. We say that yi (i ≥ 1) is one of the class labels for hr ∈ Hs
if yi is one of the attribute values for attribute category hr.
3.2.2 Utility and Privacy
We now formally define privacy and utility. The existing privacy definitions, such as
differential privacy [46], k-anonymity [47], l-diversity [48], are only for inherent-data, and
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are not suitable for inference attacks. Meanwhile, most of the existing works evaluate data
utility by only considering how much noise is added to the initial data. In this paper, we
present a finer-grained utility definition.
Intuitively, we expect released data do not help with significantly improving prediction
accuracy compared with the prediction accuracy based on prior knowledge.
Definition 3.2.4. Prior knowledge. Prior knowledge is the information related to a data
set but not necessarily obtained from the data set.
For instance, prior knowledge can be users’ movie viewing records, phone numbers, zip
codes or the publicly available Voter Registration List. Such knowledge can be obtained
from many ways rather than the data set itself. Then, privacy is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.2.5. Classifier accuracy. Classifier accuracy, denoted as Λhrc (G), is the
accuracy of classifier c trained on the available information of social graph G, and it is used
to classify G to predict attributes for category hr ∈ H.
Definition 3.2.6. Privacy. Given a social network G, prior knowledge K held by third
party users, a set of classifiers denoted by C, and a set of sensitive categories Hs, G is
(∆, C)-private if for each attribute category hr ∈ Hs, G satisfies
maxc∈CΛhrc (G,K)−maxc′∈CΛhrc′ (K) ≤ ∆
∆ denotes the additional prediction accuracy gained by third party users by utilizing
G. Clearly, ∆ ≥ 0, which is specified by data publisher. If ∆ = 0, it indicates that third
party users do not gain additional prediction accuracy in predicting sensitive attributes for
category hr ∈ Hs.
With respect to data utility, there are two factors to consider. First, the sanitized social
graph should not deviate from the initial one by too much. Second, the sanitized social
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graph should guarantee a beneficiary can effectively infer the non-sensitive information of
users. Then, we formally define it as follows:
Definition 3.2.7. Utility. Given social graph G, data dissimilarity measurer M, prior
knowledge known to third party users K, classifier set C, and non-sensitive category set
H − Hs, the sanitized graph of G, denoted as G′, satisfies (, δ)-utility if for each attribute
category hr ∈ H −Hs, the following conditions are satisfied:
(i).M(G,G′) ≤ ;
(ii). maxc∈CΛhrc (G
′,K)−maxc′∈CΛhrc′ (K) ≥ δ.
δ denotes the additional prediction accuracy gained by third party users by utilizing G′.
Clearly, δ ≥ 0. If δ = 0, it indicates that the classifier does not gain additional classification
accuracy by utilizing G′ in predicting non-sensitive attributes for category hr ∈ H −Hs. As
well, both  and δ are specified by data publisher.
Compared with the existing definitions, Definition 4.4.1 takes the inferred non-sensitive
attributes into consideration (condition (ii)). That is, any sanitization strategy should guar-
antee a beneficiary of the sanitized data and could effectively infer the non-sensitive at-
tributes.
3.2.3 Problem Definition
Based on the above privacy and utility definitions, given user-specified thresholds on
privacy and utility, the sanitization social graph is expected to achieve the desired privacy-
utility tradeoff:
Input:
(1) Social graph G(V = V k∪V U , E, X , Y = Y K∪Y U , Hs) with user set V , friendship
link set E, the set of user attribute sets X , and the set of sensitive categories Hs. yi ∈ Y is
a class label of ui for an arbitrary category hr ∈ Hs.
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(2) Y K is the set of known labels for users ui ∈ V K , where V K is the set of users with
known labels. Y U is the set of unknown labels for users ui ∈ V U , where V U is the set of
users with unknown labels.
(3) User-specified privacy threshold ∆, and utility thresholds  and δ.
Output:
Task 1: Prediction method that can predict Y U for users ui ∈ V U , where V U = V −V K .
Task 2: Data publishing method with optimized tradeoff between privacy and utility.
The first task investigates how third party users launch an inference attack to predict
sensitive attributes. A powerful inference method is expected. Since users have the option
to publish no attributes for some categories, the attribute data are usually incomplete.
Meanwhile, there are always dishonest users, so the attribute data may be inaccurate or
uncertain. Therefore, we employ the Rough Set Theory (RST) as a building block to develop
our inference method. RST is a mathematical tool that can be used to extract knowledge
from incomplete, inaccurate and uncertain data sets. It allows us to easily analyze the large
scale and diverse social network data. For the second task, RST helps us to easily distinguish
the objective attributes to be manipulated to protect against inference attacks.
3.3 Preliminaries
In this section, several concepts of RST are introduced and some illustrative examples
are given. We then describe how to use RST to extract decision rules from the attribute data.
Last, we present how to determine the class label of an user based on friendship information.
3.3.1 Rough Set Theory
We only introduce several basic concepts of RST and more details can be found in
[71]. Knowledge representation in RST is through an information system. Based on the
information system, the decision rules can be extracted.
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Table 3.1. An example information system for a Facebook data set.
V h1: Favorite musical h2: Favorite movies h3: Favorite books d: Political view
u1 Taylor Swift God’s Not Dead Heaven Is For Real Conservative
u2 Carrie Underwood Son of God I Declare Conservative
u3 Carrie Underwood God’s Not Dead Heaven Is For Real Liberal
u4 George Strait The Fast and the Furious Heaven Is For Real Green
u5 George Strait Son of God I Declare Liberal
u6 Taylor Swift Transformers The Hunger Games Conservative
u7 George Strait Son of God The Hunger Games Liberal
u8 Taylor Swift Transformers I Declare Conservative
Definition 3.3.1. Information system. An information system is a pair Γ = (V, H =
C∪D), where V is a finite set of users, and H is a nonempty finite set of attribute categories.
H includes two subsets: the set of condition attribute categories C and the set of decision
attribute categories D. For each attribute xj for category hr ∈ H, function fxj(u) : V
xj−→ Ωhr
assigns an attribute value to xj for user u, where Ωhr is the attribute value set for hr.
Example 3.3.1. A simple example of information system for a Facebook data set is presented
in Table 3.1. As shown in Table 3.1, V = {u1, u2, . . . u8}, C = {h1, h2, h3}, and D = {d}.
Attribute “Favorite movies” of u1 is assigned value “God’s Not Dead”.
Definition 3.3.2. Indiscernibility relation. Given H ′ ⊆ H, any two users ui and uj
having H ′-indiscernibility relation is denoted by INDH′(ui, uj) where
INDH′(ui, uj)
={(ui, uj) ∈ V 2 | ∀xj for H ′, fxj(ui) = fxj(uj)}
We denote the users whose attributes have the same values for H ′ as [u]H′ , called the
equivalence class of H ′-indiscernibility relation.
Example 3.3.2. Suppose H ′ = {h2, h3} which is extracted from Table 3.1. Hence, both
(u1, u3) and (u2, u5) have H
′-indiscernibility relation. Table 3.1 also indicates [u]H′ =
{{u1, u3}, {u2, u5}, {u4}, {u6}, {u7}, {u8}}.
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Definition 3.3.3. H ′-lower and H ′-upper approximation of V ′. Given V ′ ⊆ V and
H ′ ⊆ H, V ′ can be approximated using only the information contained in H ′ by constructing
H ′-lower approximation and H ′-upper approximation of V ′:
H ′V ′ = {u | [u]H′ ⊆ V ′}
H ′V ′ = {u | [u]H′ ∩ V ′ 6= Φ}
Example 3.3.3. For the information system shown in Table 3.1, let H ′ = {h2, h3} and
V ′ = {u1, u2, u6, u8}. Hence, H ′V ′ = {u1, u2, u3, u5, u6, u8} and H ′V ′ = {u6, u8}.
Definition 3.3.4. Attribute dependency. Let H ′ ⊆ H and H ′′ ⊆ H. We say that H ′′
depends on H ′ with degree k (0 ≤ k ≤ 1), denoted by H ′ →k H ′′, if
k = γ(H ′, H ′′) =
|POSH′(H ′′)|
|V | (3.1)
where POSH′(H
′′) =
⋃
X∈[x]H′′ H
′(X), called H ′-positive region of H ′′.
In particular, if k = 1, we say that A′′ totally depends on A′.
Example 3.3.4. For the information system shown in Table 3.1, let H ′ = {h2, h3} and
H ′′ = d. Since
[x]H′ = {{u1, u3}, {u2, u5}, {u4}, {u6}, {u7}, {u8}}
[x]H′′ = {{u1, u2, u6, u8}, {u4}, {u3, u5, u7}}
H ′({u1, u2, u6, u8}) = {u6, u8}
H ′({u4}) = {u4}
H ′({u3, u5, u7}) = {u7}
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we can compute
POSH′(H
′′) = {u6, u8, u4, u7}.
Hence,
k = γ(H ′, H ′′) =
|POSH′(H ′′)|
|V | = 4/8 = 1/2.
For an information system, there usually exist some redundant condition attributes that
do not provide any additional knowledge for prediiction. Hence, RST defines a reduct for
an information system as a minimum attribute set that keeps the indiscernibility relation.
Furthermore, as would be discussed in Section 3.6, reduct can help us to find the privacy-
dependent attributes and utility-dependent attributes, which is the foundation to balance
the privacy-utility tradeoff.
Definition 3.3.5. Reduct. Given an information system Γ = (V,H = C ∪D), any R ⊆ C
is a reduct of C if
(i). POSR(D) = POSC(D);
(ii). for any hr ∈ C, IND(R− hr) 6= IND(C).
After removing the repetitive row, (V,R ∪D) is called a reduct system.
Example 3.3.5. For the information system shown in Table 3.1, let R1 = {h1, h2}, R2 =
{h1, h3} and R3 = {h2, h3}. We have
POSC(D) = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8}
POSh1(D) = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8}
POSh2(D) = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7, u8}
POSh3(D) = {u4, u6, u7, u8}
Hence, we can conclude R1 and R2 are reducts of C since they also satisfy the second
condition according to Definition 3.3.2. However, R3 is not a reduct of C.
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The first condition of Definition 3.3.5 indicates that the reduct retains the indiscerni-
bility relation of the original attribute set. That is, any indiscernible pair of objects based
on R is also indiscernible in A and vice versa. The second condition indicates that R is the
minimum subset of A that keeps its indiscernibility.
3.3.2 Generating Decision Rules Based on an Attribute Set
We now introduce how the decision rules are generated based on the reduct system
(V,R ∪ D). Suppose the equivalence class of the R-indiscernibility relation and the D-
indiscernibility relation are [u]R = {P1, P2, . . . , Pm} and [u]D = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn}, respec-
tively. Each Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and Qj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) is a user or a set of users. For example, for
the information system shown in Table 3.2, [u]R = {P1 = {u1, u3, u9}, P2 = {u2, u4}, P3 =
{u5, u6}, P4 = {u7, u8}} if R = {h1, h2}, and [u]D = {Q1 = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u7, u9}, Q2 =
{u5, u6, u8}} if D = {d}.
Since both [u]R and [u]D partition V , each Pi is associated with a setMi = {Qj | Pi∩Qj 6=
Φ}. For example, P4 is associated with M4 = {Q1, Q2}.
Hence, for an arbitrary user u, we have:
If u ∈ Pi, then u ∈ Qj1 or u ∈ Qj2 . . . or u ∈ Qj|Mi| .
According to Definition 3.3.1, we know that each Pi of [u]R corresponds to an attribute
vector ~X(Pi) = {xi1, xi2 . . . xi|R|}, where an arbitrary user u ∈ Pi if and only if fxi1(u) = vxi1 and
. . . and fxi|R|(u) = vxi|R| , where vxik (1 ≤ k ≤ |R|) is the attribute value of attribute xk for the
users in Pi. For example, P1 corresponds to ~X(P1) = {“Taylor Swift”, “Gods Not Dead”}.
Similarly, suppose there is a signal decision attribute d, i.e., |D = 1|, and each Qj of
[u]D corresponds to a decision attribute value vdj , where an arbitrary user u ∈ Yj if and only
if fd(u) = vdj . For example, any u ∈ Yj if and only if fd(u) = “Conservative”.
Hence, the above rule can be rewritten as
if fxi1(u) = vxi1 and . . . and fxi|R|(u) = vxi|R| , then fd(u) = vd1 or fd(u) = vd2 , or . . ., or
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Table 3.2. Information system for generating decision rules.
V h1: Favorite musical h2: Favorite movies d: Political view
u1 Taylor Swift God’s Not Dead Conservative
u2 Carrie Underwood Son of God Conservative
u3 Taylor Swift God’s Not Dead Conservative
u4 Carrie Underwood Son of God Conservative
u5 George Strait Son of God Liberal
u6 George Strait Son of God Liberal
u7 Taylor Swift Transformers Conservative
u8 Taylor Swift Transformers Liberal
u9 Taylor Swift God’s Not Dead Conservative
fd(u) = vd|Mi| .
If Pi ⊆ Qj, which indicates the class label of any user u ∈ Pi is uniquely determined by
dj, we say Pi is a deterministic class. Otherwise, we call Pi as an indeterministic class.
Example 3.3.6. We extract decision rules from the reduct system (V,R ∪ D) shown in
Table 3.2, where R = {h1, h2} and D = {d}. Let P1 = {u1, u3, u9}, P2 = {u2, u4}, P3 =
{u5, u6}, P4 = {u7, u8}, Q1 = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x7, x9} and Q2 = {x5, x6, x8}. Based on the
prior analysis, P1, P2 and P3 are deterministic classes. Hence, the following decision rules
are extracted:
if A1 = “Taylor Swift” and A2 = “God’s Not Dead”,
then, D = “Conservative”;
if A1 = “Carrie Underwood” and A2 = “Son of God”,
then, D = “Conservative”;
if A1 = “George Strait” and A2 = “Son of God”,
then, D = “Liberal”.
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3.3.3 Prediction Based on Friendship Information
Another significant knowledge that can be utilized to infer sensitive attributes is friend-
ship information in social networks. However, it is inaccurate to extract decision rules based
on friendship information directly, since there are relatively few links from users with known
labels that connect to an arbitrary user ui. Therefore, rather than directly extracting deci-
sion rules from the friendship links of ui, we consider uj’s class, where uj ∈ Ni and Ni is the
neighbor set of ui. For clarity, ui in class yt is denoted by y
i
t.
For simplicity, the probability of ui to be in class yt, denoted as P (y
i
t), is the average
probability of its neighbors being in yt:
P (yit|Ni) =
1
|Ni|
∑
uj∈Ni
P (yjt )
However, purely calculating the average probability of neighbors would incur overfitting.
To prevent this, the weighted-vote Relational Neighbor algorithm (wvRN) [72] suggests to
add a weight to each friendship link. There are many such methods and we adopt the ones
with the assumption that the more public attributes shared by two friends, the more is the
sensitive attributes that are shared by two friends. Then we introduce weight Wi,j between
ui and uj as follows:
Wi,j =
|(A1i , . . . , Ami ) ∩ (A1j , . . . , Anj )|
|Ai|
(3.2)
Equation (4.2) calculates the total number of attributes shared by ui and uj divided by
the number of ui’s attributes. Obviously, Wi,j 6= Wi,j. Then to determine yi based on Ni
becomes the following, where Z is a normalization factor:
P (yit|Ni) =
1
Z
∑
nj∈Ni
P (yjt )×Wi,j (3.3)
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3.4 Collective inference
Unfortunately, the prediction methods described in the previous section have several
problems. The attribute-based classifier (Section 3.3.2) just considers the attribute sets of
the users it is classifying. Conversely, relation-based classifier (Section 3.3.3) only considers
the friendship information of a user. However, third party users may launch an inference
attack by exploiting all the publicly available information. Moreover, a major problem of
relation-based classifier is that it requires that at least one of the neighbors of each unlabeled
user to be located in the training set (i.e., the set of users with known labels, as shown in
Equation (4.3)). Obviously, this strict requirement is hard to be satisfied by real-world data.
Collective inference attempts to tackle the above two issues by considering both attribute-
based classifier and relation-based classifier in a collaborative manner to improve prediction
accuracy. Formally, we consider the following network prediction problem.
Definition 3.4.1. Collective inference. Given social graph G(V = V k∪V U , E, X , Y =
Y K∪Y U , Hs) with user set V , friendship link set E, the set of user attribute sets X , and the
set of sensitive categories Hs. y
i ∈ Y is a class label of ui for an arbitrary category hr ∈ Hs.
LK is the known labels for users ui ∈ V K. Collective inference is to predict Y U for users
ui ∈ V U , where V U = V − V K.
This problem is challenging as some of the user labels are unknown. A fundamental idea
is to first predict a class label approximately and then refine the predicted result iteratively.
Several collective classification algorithms have been proposed to increase accuracy when
the network users are interrelated, such as the Iterative Classification Algorithm (ICA) [73]
and Gibbs sampling (Gibbs) [74]. Many collective classification algorithms and variants,
including ICA, use an attribute-based classifier MA to predict the approximate class label at
the bootstrap stage; then, they use both attribute and link based classifier, MAR, to refine
the results. The algorithms repeat these two operations until the class labels converge. We
present an algorithm under the framework of ICA that takes RST as a local classifier (one
that uses local information, e.g., attribute sets of users), denoted by ICA-RST.
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ICA-RST is shown in Algorithm 1. It first learns an attribute-based classifier MA based
on the known labels Y K (step 1), which is a set of RST decision rules. Then, by MA, it
predicts the labels of the users with unknown labels, V U (steps 2-3). Step 5 stores the
known labels Y K and the predicted labels {yi|ui ∈ V U} in set Y R. The known labels and
the predicted labels are utilized to calculate link features for each user in V U (step 7). Step
8 then learns a classifier MAR based on all of the attributes and labels. Step 10 utilizes MAR
to predict unknown labels. Finally, Step 11 returns the predicted results.
Algorithm 1: ICA-RST
Input: V = users, E = links, X = attribute set, Y K = labels of known users
(Y K = {yi|ui ∈ V K})
Output: Y U = labels of unknown users (Y U = {yi|ui ∈ V U , V U = V − V K})
1 MA = learn RST Rule(V
K , Y K); // learn classifier MA utilizing only
attributes
2 for each user ui ∈ V U do
3 yi ←MA( ~Xi); // predict the labels of the unknown
users utilizing MA
4 for t = 1 to n do
5 Y R ← Y K ∪ {yi|ui ∈ V U}; // store the known labels and the
predicted labels in set Y R
6 for each user ui ∈ V U do
7 ~fi = calReFeats(V,E, Y
R); // calculate link features utilizing known
labels and the predicted labels
8 MAR = learn RST Rule(V, Y
R); // learn classifier MAR utilizing all of the
attributes and labels
9 for each user ui ∈ V U do
10 yi = MAR( ~Xi, ~fi); // re-predict the unknown labels utilizing
MAR
11 return Y U
Fig.3.1 shows an example for ICA-RST, which is applied to political view inference
attacks. Each step in Fig.3.1 displays a social graph consisting of five users with the cor-
responding friendship links. The class label of each node is yi, which takes value from
label set Y = {Con, Lib}, representing conservative party and liberal party, respectively.
Four users have unknown labels (V U = {u2, u3, u4, u5}) and only one user has known labels
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u1
X1 = {1, 1, 0} 
f1 = null
y1 = Co
u2
X2 = {1, 0, 1} 
f2 = {?, ?}
y2 = ?
u3
X3 = {0, 1, 1} 
f3 = {?, ?}
y3 = ?
u4
X4 = {1, 1, 1} 
f4 = {?, ?}
y4 = ?
u5
X5 = {1, 0, 0} 
f5 = {?, ?}
y5 = ?
A.) Initial state
u1
X1 = {1, 1, 0} 
f1 = null
y1 = Co
u2
X2 = {1, 0, 1} 
f2 = {?, ?}
y2 = Co
u3
X3 = {0, 1, 1} 
f3 = {?, ?}
y3 = La
u4
X4 = {1, 1, 1} 
f4 = {?, ?}
y4 = La
u5
X5 = {1, 0, 0} 
f5 = {?, ?}
y5 =Co
B.) Classify using MA (utilize attributes)
u1
X1 = {1, 1, 0} 
f1 = null
y1 = Co
u2
X2 = {1, 0, 1} 
f2 = {1, 1}
y2 = Co
u3
X3 = {0, 1, 1} 
f3 = {3, 1}
y3 = La
u4
X4 = {1, 1, 1} 
f4 = {0, 1}
y4 = La
u5
X5 = {1, 0, 0} 
f5 = {0, 1}
y5 =Co
C.) Compute links features
u1
X1 = {1, 1, 0} 
f1 = null
y1 = Co
u2
X2 = {1, 0, 1} 
f2 = {1, 1}
y2 = Co
u3
X3 = {0, 1, 1} 
f3 = {3, 1}
y3 = Co
u4
X4 = {1, 1, 1} 
f4 = {0, 1}
y4 = La
u5
X5 = {1, 0, 0} 
f5 = {0, 1}
y5 =Co
D.) Classify using MAR (utilize attributes and links)
u1
X1 = {1, 1, 0} 
f1 = null
y1 = Co
u2
X2 = {1, 0, 1} 
f2 = {2, 0}
y2 = Co
u3
X3 = {0, 1, 1} 
f3 = {3, 1}
y3 = Co
u4
X4 = {1, 1, 1} 
f4 = {1, 0}
y4 = La
u5
X5 = {1, 0, 0} 
f5 = {1, 0}
y5 =Co
E.) Recompute links features
Repeat steps D and E
Figure 3.1. An example for ICA-RST.
(V K = {u1}). In step A, no labels yi and link features ~fi in V U have been predicted, so they
are marked with a question mark. In step B, attribute-based classifier MA assigns a label
to ui in V
U using only attribute ~Xi. Based on the predicted labels in step B, step C then
computes the link features of each ui. For instance, ~f3 = {3, 1} in step C since u3 has three
links with label Co (i.e., u1, u2, u5) and one link with label La (i.e., u4). In step D, classifier
MAR reclassifies users in V
U using the attributes and link features, and it recomputes the
link features. Repeat step D and step E until the labels of ui in V
U converge to a stable
state.
3.5 Hiding Sensitive Information
The existing privacy preservation techniques, such as differential privacy [46], k-
anonymity [47], l-diversity [48] and so forth, are designed for inherent-data privacy only, and
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do not protect against inference attacks directly. For instance, differential privacy ensures
that the aggregation results of a data set that operates the differential privacy algorithms
are the same with or without one row. k-anonymity guarantees that third party users cannot
distinguish real data from at least their nearest k− 1 neighbors. Since our goal is to release
social network data while preserving data utility and protecting against inference attacks,
the above techniques are not competent.
To develop a sanitization strategy, there are three issues to be addressed concerning
inference attacks. First, we should understand the relationship between sensitive attributes
and the released data set. For instance, Bryden made Facebook analysis and found that
conservatives with distinguished cultural tastes than other partisans [75]. Second, it is
necessary to figure out which attribute or link manipulating method(s) should be carried
out to achieve the desired privacy-utility tradeoff. For example, we can add or modify an
attribute or a link to add noises to the released data. Also, we can remove some attributes
and links to anonymize the released data. However, which one of the above methods are
better? Last, for a specific manipulating method, how to effectively carry it out to achieve the
desired privacy-utility tradeoff? For example, which attributes and links should be removed
to markedly decrease the prediction accuracy on sensitive attributes while resulting in less
accuracy decrease on non-sensitive attributes. In the following, we address the three issues.
3.5.1 Choosing Attributes to Manipulate
One of the most significant aspects is the dependency relationships between non-
sensitive attributes and sensitive attributes. Through analyzing dependence relationships,
we can reveal which publicly available attributes dominate the prediction results on sensi-
tive attributes. Namely, dependency relationship provides the theoretical basis to determine
which attributes should be chosen to manipulate. For example, suppose political view de-
pends on activity and favorite movies, which indicates that we can manipulate these two
attributes to reduce the prediction accuracy on political view. We denote the attributes that
dominate the classification results on sensitive attributes as privacy-dependent attributes.
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As shown in Definition 3.3.4 in Section 3.3.1, given an arbitrary information system
Γ = (V,A = C ∪ D), any decision attribute set D′ ⊆ D depending on condition attribute
set C ′ ∈ C with degree k can be calculated as C ′ →k D′. Here, C and D can be viewed as
publicly available attributes and sensitive attributes, respectively.
To hide sensitive attributes, our idea is to manipulate the most dependent attributes
with respect to each sensitive attribute: for an arbitrary user ui with attribute set ~Xi, and
a sensitive attribute xj = {hr : lt}, we can find the most dependent attribute xs ∈ C (1 ≤
s ≤ |C|) for sensitive attribute xj based on the following:
argmaxs{k | xs →k lt}
In practice, we can find any nt-most dependent attributes for sensitive attribute with
attribute value lt, after extracting the attributes with the largest nt dependence degree.
However, simply manipulating privacy-dependent attributes could incur utility reduc-
tion if we do not take utility into consideration. Consider the scenario that IMDb makes use
of the data released by Facebook to suggest proper movies and TV programs to target users.
It may classify users considering different movie types to make recommendations, depending
on users’ attribute sets. However, movie types could also depend on a privacy-dependent at-
tribute. For example, the possible movie types are closely related to the attribute of “favorite
movies”.
We denote the attributes that dominate the classification results on non-sensitive at-
tributes as utility-dependent attributes. Hence, the following statement determines our
choice:
Problem 3.5.1. Given social graph G(V, E, X = C∪D) with publicly available attribute set
C and sensitive attribute set D, determine the set of attributes C ′ ⊆ C so that G′(V,E,C ′∪D)
has the most decrease in prediction accuracy in D, while preserving the utility of C.
Hence, the double dependency relationships become a challenge for the attribute ma-
nipulating method.
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3.5.2 Attribute Manipulating Method
Obviously, attributes can be manipulated in three manners: adding new attributes, re-
moving existing attributes, and perturbing (substitute one attribute to another). Since both
adding and perturbing decrease prediction accuracy on sensitive information by introducing
different types of noises, they are collectively called the obfuscation method. Removing, how-
ever, can be viewed as an anonymization method. Taking which manipulating method(s)
depends on data semantics, privacy and utility metrics and so on. For example, if users spec-
ify a set of attributes as sensitive and quantify utility as the expected number of released
attributes, the removing method could be advisable.
Suppose we just release our data to the public and do not announce what the data is
used for. For example, social graph G is released online for research purpose and xp is a
privacy-dependent attribute of G. In this case, we have no direct measurement to determine
how to perturb ap; namely, use what attribute to substitute xp, since no applications are
specified. In this case, the removing method may be a proper choice. We just need to remove
the privacy-dependent attributes.
For example, consider two social graphs G1 and G2, which are sanitized graphs of G after
applying the obfuscation and anonymization methods, respectively. When we consider G1
in which there is an attribute “favorite movies: Titanic”, based on the employed obfuscation
method, the original attribute set may not have this attribute or have an obsoletely distinct
one. Hence, utility cannot be guaranteed by an obfuscation method when the application is
not specified.
However, if the data are released for a special purpose such as movie recommendation,
we could evaluate the changing utility when manipulating the attributes. In this case, the
perturbing method could be a proper choice since properly perturbing can guarantee the
desired privacy-utility tradeoff. For example, when we consider G2, it may sacrifice much
utility if there exists intersection between privacy-dependent attributes and utility-dependent
attributes. Due to these observations, we consider removing and perturbing separately.
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3.5.3 Link Manipulating Method
Another option for protecting against inference attacks is to manipulate links. Unlike
attribute, link manipulating methods only add new links and remove existing links. With
the same reason, we only consider the link anonymization method in the case of releasing the
data set to the public and without announcing what the data are used for. With the same
goal, the manipulated links should reduce the prediction accuracy on sensitive attributes.
Suppose that adding or removing a link renders the prediction results on sensitive attributes
locating in each class with a same probability, and we call this link as indistinguishable link,
which is formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.5.1. ∆′-Indistinguishable link. Given social graph G(V,E,X ) and an
arbitrary ui ∈ V with possible class labels Y = {y1, y2, . . .}, and P{yit} is the probability
of ui with label yt. Any link fj ∈ Fi,j is an indistinguishable link of ui if removing fj results
that
V ar{P{yi1}, P{yi2}, . . . , P{yi|Y |}} ≤ ∆′ (3.4)
where V ar(S) is for valuating the variance of set S.
To hide sensitive attributes through removing links, our idea is to manipulate the most
indistinguishable link with respect to each user. We can find the most indistinguishable link
fj for ui based on the following:
argminj{V ar{P{yi1}, P{yi2}, . . . , P{yi|Y |}} | removing fj}
3.6 Collective Method
To protect against inference attacks, we attempt to manipulate attributes by perturbing
and removing separately in the respective situations. As mentioned in Section 3.5.2, these two
methods must be restricted by the utility requirements. In this section, in order to achieve
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the desired privacy-utility tradeoff, we present how to utilize removing and perturbing in a
collective manner.
Clearly, simply removing or perturbing Privacy-Dependent Attributes (PDAs) could re-
duce prediction accuracy on non-sensitive attributes. Hence, there should exist a compromise
strategy for manipulating the PDAs to achieve the privacy-utility tradeoff. Therefore, rather
than removing or perturbing PDAs directly, we analyze the relationship between PDAs and
Utility-Dependent Attributes (UDAs) first.
For simplicity, we have the following collective method:
Algorithm 2: Collective method
Input: G, PDAs, UDAs
Output: collective method
1 if PDAs ∩ UDAs = Φ then
2 removing PDAs;
3 else then
4 removing PDAs - Core;
5 perturbing Core
Algorithm 2 shows that if there are no shared attributes between PDAs and UDAs,
we just need to remove the PDAs since they have no contributions on utility (Step 2).
Conversely, with the same reason, we remove the difference set between PDAs and the
shared attribute set Core (step 4). For the shared attributes, perturbing them to optimize
the privacy-utility tradeoff (step 5).
The details of the perturbing method on Core in Algorithm 2 are presented in Subsection
3.6.1.
3.6.1 Perturbing
We formally define the shared attributes as a Core.
Definition 3.6.1. Core. Given an information system Γ = (V, A = C ∪D), D = Du∪Dp,
where Du and Dp are two decision attribute sets for utility and privacy, respectively. We
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say that C ′ ⊆ C is a core of Du and Dp if C ′ ⊆ Ru and C ′ ⊆ Rp, where Ru and Rp are the
reduct of C for Γ = (V,A = C ∪Du) and Γ = (V,A = C ∪Dp), respectively.
Our idea is to substitute each attribute in the Core with a generic attribute, which
ensures that third party users cannot get specific information to increase prediction accuracy
on sensitive attributes, while guarantees no significant accuracy reduction on data utility.
Moreover, the higher level of generalization, the more preference to privacy for the utility-
privacy tradeoff. Since there are different levels of generalization, the generic attributes can
be organized into a hierarchy, which is formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.6.2. Generic Attribute Hierarchy. A Generic Attribute Hierarchy (GAH)
is a finite hierarchical ordering. The first layer of the ordering is one of the privacy-dependent
attributes, and each parent layer is a generic of the sublayer.
Definition 3.6.2 indicates that the ancestor of the GAH is the highest level of general-
ization of initial attributes. Substituting one privacy-dependent attribute with the ancestor
of the GAH would render the highest level of privacy. For example, if one attribute value in
core is for category favorite movies, the corresponding GAH can be
Star Wars→ Fantasy→ American film
This indicates that we can substitute original attribute “Star Wars” with “American
film”, in order to get the highest level of generalization. We could also substitute it with
“Fantasy” to give more preference to utility for the utility-privacy tradeoff since “Fantasy”
is more specific than “American film”. Hence, GAH guarantees that we can programmati-
cally determine which level of generic value should be chosen to optimize the privacy-utility
tradeoff.
Algorithm 3 presents the generation process of the generic values for guaranteeing op-
timal -utility.
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Algorithm 3: Generate generic value
Input: Core,  = utility threshold
Output: GAH
1 while maxc∈CΛ(G′,K, Xnon)−maxc′∈CΛ(K, Xnon) ≥  do
2 further generate all the current attributes;
3 return Perturbed Core
3.7 Evaluation
3.7.1 Datasets
In our experiments, we investigate three different Facebook datasets. The first one is the
SNAP Facebook dataset1 which contains user friendships and a number of node attributes
such as gender, birthday, position, employer, location, etc. The other two are the Facebook
dataset containing all the Facebook friendships at Caltech and MIT in 2005, as well as a
number of node attributes such as student/faculty status flag, gender, graduation year, aca-
demic major, etc. 2 For convenience, we denote these three datasets as SNAP, Caltech, and
MIT, respectively. In Caltech and MIT, each attribute is specified by a numeric value and
each of which indicates a corresponding attribute. However, in SNAP, each attribute is spec-
ified by a 0/1 value and each of which indicates the absence/presence of the corresponding
attribute. For example, attribute “EducationDegree: undergraduate; master; PHD” with
attribute value 010 means that the attribute value is master. For convenience, we map each
attribute in SNAP into an unique numeric value in each attribute category. For example,
the above attribute value 010 in Education degree is mapped to 2.
In Table 3.3, some general statistics about the three datasets are provided. It shows
that all of the three graphs are almost fully connected.
1https://snap.stanford.edu/data/egonets-Facebook.html
2http://www.michaelzimmer.org/2011/02/15/facebook-data-of-1-2-million-users-from-2005-released/
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Table 3.3. General statistics about the three datasets
Network property SNAP Caltech MIT
Number of nodes 792 769 6440
Number of friendship links 14024 16656 251252
Number of attributes for each user 20 7 7
Number of values for decision attribute 2 4 7
Number of components in the graph 10 4 18
Nodes in largest connected component 775 762 6402
Edges in largest connected component 14006 16651 251230
Diameter longest shortest path 10 6 8
3.7.2 Experiment Settings
In our experiments, we regard gender in SANP and student/faculty status flag (flag for
short) in Caltech and MIT as sensitive attributes.
Table 3.3 shows that there are 2, 4, and 7 attribute values in SNAP, Caltech and MIT,
respectively, which are regarded as class labels here.
We predict a sensitive attribute with the following attack models: 1) the attack model
with absence of link information (AttrOnly), 2) the attack model with absence of attribute
information (LinkOnly), and 3) the attack model based on collective inference (CC).
As mentioned in Section 3.4, a major issue is raised if directly executing LinkOnly
requires that at least one of the neighbors of each unlabeled user locates in the training set
(as shown in Equation (4.3)). Hence, in our experiments, we first predict the class label of
those unlabeled nodes by classifying their attribute sets. Next, we predict the class label of
any user ui by calculating the weighted average probability of its neighbors with one class
label (as calculated in Equation (4.3)).
Moreover, CC employs attribute based classifier to predict the approximate class label
at the bootstrap stage. Then, it uses classifier that based on both attribute and link, MAR,
to refine the results. In our experiments, we employ the following MAR
αPA{yit}+ βPL{yit} (3.5)
where P{yit} and PL{yit} are the probabilities of ui with label yt, assigned by AttrOnly
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Table 3.4. Information of the Reduct Systems for SNAP, Caltech and MIT
Decision attribute No. of condition attributes
Gender in SNAP 19 → 13
Flag in Caltech 6 → 5
Flag in MIT 6 → 5
and LinkOnly, respectively. α + β = 1, where α and β represent the ratio of AttrOnly
and LinkOnly, respectively. The values of α and β are determined by dataset features.
Specifically, α is larger than β iff the node attributes are more indicative than node relations.
To determine α and β, we study a set of experiments with multiple combinations and find the
optimal one that renders the best prediction accuracy for CC. In Section 3.7.3, we set both
α and β as 0.5; namely, an average prediction result assigned by AttrOnly and LinkOnly is
expected. In Section 3.7.4, the utility and privacy under several pairs of α and β would be
discussed.
For the attribute-based classifier utilized in AttrOnly, LinkOnly and CC, we carry it
out with three techniques: RST, Navie Bayes and KNN [76]. Hence, with different attribute-
based classifiers, AttrOnly can be further specified as: 1) RST, 2) Navie Bayes, 3) KNN;
LinkOnly can be further specified as: 4) LinkOnly-RST, 5) LinkOnly-Bayes, 6) LinkOnly-
KNN; and CC can be further specified as: 7) ICA-RST, 8) ICA-Bayes, 9) ICA-KNN.
3.7.3 Effect of Attribute-removal and Link-removal Methods on Inference
Attacks
In this part, we aim to protect against inference attacks with the following sanitization
methods: 1) Attribute removal: remove the most privacy dependent attributes, namely, the
attributes in the reduct system (Section 3.5.1), and 2) Link removal: remove the distinguish-
able links (Section 3.5.3).
Table 3.4 lists the information of the reduct systems for these three datasets. We can
see that in Table 3.4, the number of condition attributes is reduced from 19 to 13 in SNAP
and from 6 to 5 in Caltech and MIT, respectively.
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SNAP Fig.3.2(a), Fig.3.2(b) and Fig.3.2(c) show the prediction accuracy of differ-
ent attack models on SNAP with the removal of the most privacy dependent attributes.
Fig.3.2(d), Fig.3.2(e) and Fig.3.2(f) show the prediction accuracy of different attack models
on SNAP with the removal of the indistinguishable links. As we can see from Fig.3.2(a),
Fig.3.2(b) and Fig.3.2(c), removing the most privacy dependent attributes is generally suc-
cessful in reducing the prediction accuracy on sensitive attributes.
It is shown that there is a decrease in the prediction accuracy with more and more
attributes being removed. Surprisingly, however, the accuracy of LinkOnly does not decrease
significantly while we remove attributes. For LinkOnly, as discussed in Section 3.7.2, we first
predict the class labels of those unlabeled nodes by classifying their attribute sets; hence,
the accuracy decrease of attribute-based classifier should also render the accuracy decrease
for LinkOnly. A possible explanation is that just a small part of the nodes need labels in the
first step of LinkOnly through classifying attribute set, since most of the labeled nodes are
in the training set. Hence, removing attributes do not have a significant influence. Clearly,
we can see that CC generally outperforms AttrOnly and LinkOnly.
The results in Fig.3.2(d), Fig.3.2(e) and Fig.3.2(f) show that removing the indistinguish-
able links is generally successful in reducing the prediction accuracy on sensitive attributes.
However, we find a surprising phenomena in Fig.2: a volatile prediction accuracy after the
removal of a single attribute or link. Especially, a much more volatile prediction accuracy
after the removal of a single link. For the volatility related to attribute, it is a result of large
class size difference in the SNAP dataset. Since approximately 65% of the nodes in SNAP
are ”male” and there are no attributes that are highly dependent on gender, a small change
of attributes can affect the prediction accuracy in uncontrollable ways. For the volatility re-
lated to links, it is a result of the local optimal link-removal strategy. Since the link-removal
strategy always manipulates the most indistinguishable link with respect to each user, it
cannot guarantee the removed link is globally optimal. Therefore, a small change of links
can also affect the prediction accuracy in uncontrollable ways.
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Caltech Fig.3.3(a), Fig.3.3(b) and Fig.3.3(c) show the prediction accuracy of different
attack models on Caltech with the most privacy dependent attributes removed. Fig.3.3(d),
Fig.3.3(e) and Fig.3.3(f) show the prediction accuracy of different attack models on Caltech
with the removal of the indistinguishable links. As we can see from Fig.3.3(a), Fig.3.3(b)
and Fig.3.3(c), compared with the results on SNAP, there is a much more volatile prediction
accuracy after the removal of a single attribute. This is a result of larger class size difference
in Caltech than that of SNAP. Since approximately 72% of the nodes in Caltech have a same
class label and there are no attributes that are highly dependent on flag, a small change of
attributes can affect the prediction accuracy in uncontrollable ways.
MIT Fig.3.4(a), Fig.3.4(b) and Fig.3.4(c) show the prediction accuracy of different
attack models on MIT with the most privacy dependent attributes removed. Fig.3.4(d),
Fig.3.4(e) and Fig.3.4(f) show the prediction accuracy of different attack models on MIT
with the removal of the indistinguishable links. Fig.4 shows that removing the most pri-
vacy dependent attributes or indistinguishable links is generally successful in reducing the
prediction accuracy on sensitive attributes. As we can see from Fig.3.4(a), Fig.3.4(b) and
Fig.3.4(c), compared with the results on Caltech, there is a less volatile prediction accuracy
after the removal of a single attribute. This appears to be a result of larger class size differ-
ence in the Caltech dataset than that of the MIT. Approximately 67% of the nodes in MIT
have a same class label and there are no attributes that are highly dependent of flag.
Fig.3.5(a) and Fig.3.5(b) show the prediction accuracy of different attack models on
MIT with the most privacy dependent attributes and indistinguishable links removed simul-
taneously. As shown in Fig.3.5, the prediction accuracy is more sensitive to the removal of
attribute than the removal of link.
3.7.4 Effect of Collective Method on Inference Attacks
We further test the collective method to evaluate the effectiveness of our data sanitiza-
tion. Since there are no utility and privacy expectation specified for each dataset, we select
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Table 3.5. Setting of utility attribute and privacy attribute
Utility attribute Privacy attribute
SNAP education type gender
Caltech gender flag
MIT gender flag
two attributes as privacy attribute and utility attribute, respectively. The selection of the
above two attributes is listed in Table 3.5. We attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of our
method in achieving a desired privacy/utility tradeoff: reducing the prediction accuracy on
sensitive attribute while ensuring the prediction accuracy on utility atteibute.
Since each attribute has a numeric value, we cannot generate a generic value from the
semantic view directly. However, we can map several attribute values to an interval and
generalize them with an unique value in this interval. Algorithm 4 is used to generate
generic attribute values. For each attribute category hr in Core, Algorithm 4 first calculates
the maximum and minimum attribute values of all the users for hr (steps 2-3). Then, it
calculates the range between MAX and MIN under generic level L (step 4). Finally, for
each user i, Algorithm 4 maps its original attribute value xi,r to b(Xi,r −MIN)/Rangec
(steps 5-7). In Algorithm 4, perturbing degree decreases with the increase of generalization
level L.
Algorithm 4: Generate generic value
Input: Core, L = generalization level
Output: Generic attribute set with level L
1 for each attribute category hr ∈ Core do
2 MAXr = max(x1,r, x1,r, . . . , x|V |,r) ;
3 MINr = min(x1,r, x1,r, . . . , x|V |,r) ;
4 Ranger = b(MAXr −MINr)/L+ 1c;
5 for i = 1 to |V | do
6 xi,r = b(xi,r −MIN)/Rangec;
7 return xi,r
According to Algorithm 2, the information for PDAs, UDAs and Core for SNAP, Caltech
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Table 3.6. Information for PDAs, UDAs and Core
Dataset No. of UDAs No. of PDAs - Core No. of Core
SNAP 7 6 6
Catech 3 2 1
MIT 3 2 1
Table 3.7. Maximum utility/privacy under collective, attribute removal and link removal
methods with α = 0.5, β = 0.5
Dataset Collective Attribute removal Link removal
SNAP 1.1967 1.1639 1.1639
Caltech 1.5273 1.3433 1.3433
MIT 1.2636 1.1881 1.1931
and MIT are shown in Table 3.6.
We test multiple levels of generalization (set generalization level as L = 5, 6, 7, 8) and
compare the collective method with the data removal and link removal sanitization methods.
We use utility/privacy as privacy-utility tradeoff criteria to evaluate the performance of these
three data-sanitization methods.
Table 3.7 shows the maximum utility/privacy under these three methods, with α = 0.5
and β = 0.5. From Table 3.7, we observe that the collective method achieves the best
privacy/utility tradeoff with ratio 1.1967, 1.5273 and 1.2636 in SNAP, Caltech and MIT,
respectively. Table 3.8, Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 show the utility/privacy under different
generalization levels, and different numbers of removed attributes and links. In Table 3.8,
Table 3.9 and Table 3.10, “R-Attr”, “R-Link” and “Uti/pri” represent “Number of Removed
attribute”, “Number of Removed link” and “Utility/privacy”, respectively. As shown in
Table 3.8, Table 3.9 and Table 3.10, utility to privacy ratio decreases with the increase of
perturbing degree (L from 5 to 8 ). Moreover, utility to privacy ratio decreases as well
with more and more attributes and links being removed. Additionally, we observe that
our proposed collective method generally outperforms attribute removal and link removal
method.
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Table 3.8. General statistics about priacy/utility on SNAP with α = 0.5, β = 0.5
L Uti/pri No. of R-Attr Uti/pri No. of R-Link Uti/pri
5 1.1613 0 1.1639 0 1.1639
6 1.1803 3 1.0862 200 1.1500
7 1.1967 6 0.9524 400 1.1333
8 1.1967 9 0.9375 600 1.1148
Table 3.9. General statistics about priacy/utility on Caltech with α = 0.5, β = 0.5
L Uti/pri No. of R-Attr Uti/pri No. of R-Link Uti/pri
5 1.4839 0 1.3433 0 1.3433
6 1.4918 1 1.1970 400 1.2464
7 1.5112 2 1.0274 800 1.2206
8 1.5273 3 0.9865 1200 1.1690
Table 3.10. General statistics about priacy/utility on MIT with α = 0.5, β = 0.5
L Uti/pri No. of R-Attr Uti/pri No. of R-link Uti/pri
5 1.2313 0 1.1881 300 1.1931
6 1.2425 1 1.0469 600 1.1901
7 1.2580 2 1.0342 900 1.1897
8 1.2636 3 0.9698 1200 1.1798
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Table 3.11. Maximum utility/privacy under collective, attribute removal and link removal
methods with α = 0.1, β = 0.9
Dataset Collective Attribute removal Link removal
SNAP 1.3019 1.3148 1.4800
CalTech 1.4032 1.3770 1.3770
MIT 1.2274 1.2121 1.2239
Table 3.12. Maximum utility/privacy under collective, attribute removal and link removal
methods with α = 0.9, β = 0.1
Dataset Collective Attribute removal Link removal
SNAP 1.1356 1.1754 1.1930
CalTech 1.3968 1.2985 1.2985
MIT 1.2674 1.2101 1.2132
Furthermore, we evaluate the maximum utility/privacy under different combinations of
α and β: α = 0.1, β = 0.9 and α = 0.9, β = 0.1. The results are shown in Table 3.11 and
Table 3.12. Table 3.7, Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 show that utility/privacy value of collective
method is always better than that of attribute removal and link removal method, when an
average prediction result are assigned by AttrOnly and LinkOnly, i.e., α = 0.5 and β = 0.5.
3.8 Conclusions
We address two issues in this paper: (a) how exactly third party users launch an inference
attack to predict sensitive information of users, and (b) are there effective strategies to
protect against such an attack to achieve a desired privacy-utility tradeoff. For the first
issue, we show that collectively utilizing both attribute and link information can significantly
increase prediction accuracy for sensitive information. For the second issue, we explore
the dependence relationships for utility/public attributes, and privacy/public attributes.
Based on these results, we propose a Collective Method that take advantages of various data
manipulating methods to guarantee sanitizing user data does not incur a bad impact on data
utility. Using Collective Method, we are able to effectively sanitize social network data prior
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to release. The solutions for the two addressed issues are proven to be effective towards three
real social datasets.
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Figure 3.2. Sensitive attribute prediction accuracy on SNAP with different attack models.
With most privacy-dependent attributes removed, and (a) Bayes, (b) KNN, (c) RST as
attribute-based classifier; With indistinguishable links removed, and (d) Bayes, (e) KNN, (f)
RST as attribute-based classifier.
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Figure 3.3. Sensitive attribute prediction accuracy on Caltech with different attack models.
With most privacy-dependent attributes removed, and (a) Bayes, (b) KNN, (c) RST as
attribute-based classifier; With indistinguishable links removed, and (d) Bayes, (e) KNN, (f)
RST as attribute-based classifier.
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Figure 3.4. Sensitive attribute prediction accuracy on MIT with different attack models.
With most privacy-dependent attributes removed, and (a) Bayes, (b) KNN, (c) RST as
attribute-based classifier; With indistinguishable links removed, and (d) Bayes, (e) KNN, (f)
RST as attribute-based classifier.
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Figure 3.5. Predicting accuracy on MIT with the most privacy dependent attributes and
indistinguishable links removed simultaneously: (a) ICA-KNN as attack model; (b) ICA-
Bayes as attack model.
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Chapter 4
TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND CUSTOMIZED DATA UTILITY
FOR SOCIAL DATA PUBLISHING
4.1 Introduction
Among the many big data resources, social networks contribute considerable amount
of data covering all the aspects of frontend and backend. Facebook has 1.65 billion users
with 1 billion active users per month, Twitter has 600 million users with 0.5 billion tweets
published per day, Amazon has 304 million users with 9.65 billion items traded per year,
Tencent QQ has 829 million active users with up to 210 million simultaneous online users,
WeChat has over a billion users with 700 million active users, etc. With such large scale
of and variety of data, Social Network Analysis (SNA) becomes increasingly important for
classifying end users, predicting buying interests, foretelling event occurrence, etc. Recent
years have witnessed the boom of social networks, offering a great opportunity for SNA to
prompt more novel applications.
Although the abundant social data bring valuable benefits, they unfortunately raise
stringent privacy concerns as well. Each social network user is generally associated with
an attribute set which may contain sensitive attributes like location, gender, sexual orienta-
tion, etc. Such personal information could be exploited by third parties like data analysts,
marketer, or social media itself. Any third parties with malicious intentions on sensitive
information of users can be viewed as adversaries and they breach user privacy by collecting
sensitive data first. People now begin to concern about the privacy issue and become more
conservative in publishing personal and sensitive data, which may degrade data publishing
scale and drive users to publish anonymized data. Therefore, the conflict between privacy
concerns and data utility promotes adversaries to exploit sensitive information contained in
the published data.
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Concerns derived from inference attacks towards sensitive information contained in user
data is represented as latent-data privacy, where the inference attacks usually employ statis-
tical analysis, machine learning or data mining techniques to infer sensitive information. For
instance, suppose a user does not disclose her opinions and interests online. Unfortunately, it
is easy to predict some of her opinions and interests if it is publicly known that she is affiliat-
ed with any particular organization or club. ABCNews.com and Boston Globe [69] shown it
is achievable to infer the sexual orientation of a user through mining a Facebook subnetwork
involving the user’s friendship relations, gender, and other attributes. Latent-data privacy
breaches could incur serious negative repercussions.
Publishing sanitized data is generally adopted to protect latent-data privacy. Data
sanitization methods introduce noises by sanitizing attribute sets or social links. Although
sanitizing publicly available data can help with protecting latent-data privacy, such simple
methods could also reduce data utility for SNA. On the one hand, some user attributes
are indicative for specific social analysis which is expected to be accurately predicted. For
instance, a SNA server utilizes published Facebook data to make movie recommendation for
target users. Unfortunately, some dominant attributes, such as ”gender”, may have been
sanitized to protect latent-data privacy, degrading recommendation performance. On the
other hand, in addition to sanitizing attributes, sanitizing social network links can distort
friendship relations among users and change one’s social status, which is another reason of
reducing data utility for SNA. For example, social link sanitization can turn an influential
user to an unsocial one. Therefore, effective privacy preserving SNA strategies are crucial
for big social network data.
In this work, we explore how to balance the tradeoff between latent-data privacy and
data utility. We assume adversaries collect user data, and some privacy-unconscious users
publish their sensitive latent information. We first formalize the metrics to measure data
utility loss and latent-data privacy. Then, we propose two data sanitization methods that
sanitize social attributes and links, respectively. Finally, data-sanitization strategies are
proposed, which should not degrade the benefits brought by social network data, while
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sensitive latent information can still be protected.
To measure data utility loss, we introduce prediction accuracy deviation and network
structure disparity. Both of them cause utility loss because of the employed data sanitization
strategy. We investigate how to measure them and their relationship. Previous works usually
consider them separately. Network structure disparity not only affects prediction accuracy,
but also limits social interaction among users. The current metrics do not comprehensively
measure data utility and could sacrifice more utility in realizing privacy-utility tradeoff. Our
work does consider both prediction accuracy deviation and network structure disparity. For
latent-data privacy, we expect our data sanitization strategy can combat against powerful
adversaries with abundant prior knowledge who launch inference attacks. Thus, it is neces-
sary to figure out how adversaries launch inference attacks. Previous works primarily assume
relatively weak adversaries such that the proposed data sanitization strategy is not effective.
Our work does consider this problem and quantify the capabilities of adversaries.
The previous studies for privacy-utility tradeoff have several deficiencies. First,
attribute-sanitization and link-sanitization are separately considered, degrading the privacy
preserving effect. Second, relatively weak adversaries are assumed so that the proposed da-
ta sanitization strategies are not sufficient to combat against powerful adversaries. Third,
structure utility loss caused by social structure disparity is ignored so that preserved utility
is overestimated. Therefore, the previous studies cannot effectively optimize the tradeoff
between latent-data privacy and data utility. In this paper, we identify an optimization
problem seeking a data sanitization strategy to realize the maximum latent-data privacy
with customized data utility. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
1. We consider prediction utility loss and structure utility loss simultaneously rather than
considering them separately.
2. We assume powerful adversaries who can launch optimal inference attacks instead of
weak adversaries.
3. Rather than separately considering attribute-sanitization and link-sanitization, we col-
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lectively sanitize social links and attributes.
We organize the paper as follows. Section 4.2 introduces Network model and problem
definition. Section 4.3 introduces the prediction method for latent attributes and data-
sanitization method. In Section 4.4, privacy and utility metrics are introduced. The data
sanitization strategy to optimize the privacy-utility tradeoff is presented in Section 4.5. The
performance evaluation are shown in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes the paper.
4.2 Problem Statement
4.2.1 Social Network Model
Definition 4.2.1. Social network. Social network is represented by graph model
G(V,E,X ), with user set V , link set E, and the set of attribute sets, X . For any link
eij ∈ E between users ui and uj, eij ∈ E also indicates eji ∈ E.
Definition 4.2.2. Attribute set. For user ui ∈ V , its attribute set is represented by an
attribute vector Xi ∈ X . Each attribute xj ∈ Xi (1 ≤ j ≤ |Xi|) takes value(s) from the j-th
dimension.
For social network data, a SNA server performs analysis to predict users’ latent in-
formation such as preferences. Then, according to the predicted results, the corresponding
services are provided. For example, a SNA server can predict movie preference of users by
classifying the users into different classes such as action, adventure, comedy, etc. Howev-
er, adversaries also attempt to gain benefit from users’ social relationships and attribute
set to infer sensitive latent information. These two types of latent information related to
data utility and latent-data privacy are denoted as Sensitive Latent Attributes (SLA) and
Non-Sensitive Latent Attributes (NSLA), respectively.
Definition 4.2.3. SLA. SLA is a set of unpublished sensitive attributes, yet such attributes
could be predicted from published social network data combined with prior knowledge.
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Definition 4.2.4. NSLA. NSLA is a set of unpublished non-sensitive attributes, yet such
attributes can be predicted from published social network data combined with prior knowledge.
We expect NSLA can be accurately predicted so that satisfactory services can be guar-
anteed. Conversely, to protect the privacy of SLA, we expect SLA does not being predicted
accurately. Furthermore, social network structure should be preserved such as node degree,
centrality, betweenness, etc. Thus, there exists a tradeoff between latent-data privacy and
data utility. Utility and latent-data privacy are formally defined as follows.
Definition 4.2.5. Latent-data privacy. Latent-data privacy preserving is to protect the
SLA of each user.
Definition 4.2.6. Utility. The utility of a social network dataset is high iff 1) a SNA server
has a high prediction accuracy for NSLA; and 2) the social network structure is effectively
preserved.
For the sake of brevity, we omit the subscript and use X and X ′ to denote an original
and sanitized attribute set of a user, respectively, in the rest of the paper without confusion.
4.2.2 Model of Adversaries
We assume powerful adversaries with abundant prior knowledge about users, and they
can launch optimal inference attacks to infer the SLA of each user. This assumption allows
the constructed data-sanitation method can combat against adversaries with a larger range
of capability.
There exists a prior probability for a user’s attribute vector X, denoted as ψ(X), which
represents the probability of a user with attribute set X. For a user, all her possible attribute
sets satisfy
∑
ψ(X) = 1. We call the set of ψ(X) as a user’s profile.
Definition 4.2.7. Profile. The profile of a user is a set of probabilities Ψ = {ψ(X1), ψ(X2), . . . , ψ(Xk)},∑
1≤i≤k ψ(Xi) = 1, where each ψ(Xi) is the probability of a user with attribute set Xi and k
is the number of possible attribute sets.
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Table 4.1. Major symbols
Parameter Definition
X Set of attribute sets
Xi Attribute set of user ui
xj j-th attribute
ψ(X) Prior probability of attribute set X
lit t-th latent attribute, lt, of ui
P (lit) Probability of ui with latent attribute lt
Wi,j Weight between ui and uj
f(X ′|X) Attribute sanitization strategy
L(X ′|X) link sanitization strategy
 Structure-utility loss threshold
δ Prediction-utility loss threshold
First, we assume adversaries know each user’s profile. Second, adversaries are assumed
to know the data-sanitization strategy employed to realize the tradeoff between utility and
privacy. Based on the above knowledge, optimal inference attacks are launched by adver-
saries.
4.2.3 Problem Definition
In this paper, we study the following problem.
Input:
(1) Social graph G, SLA and NSLA of users.
(2) Utility thresholds  and δ.
Output:
The data sanitization strategy that minimizes the predication accuracy for unpublished
SLA and satisfies utility threshold  and δ.
For clarity, the meanings of the symbols are summarized in Table 4.1.
4.3 Preliminaries
In this section, the prediction method is presented to predict both SLA and NSLA of a
user based on published social data.
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4.3.1 Prediction Method for Latent Attributes
We assume powerful adversaries that launch inference attacks by utilizing all publicly
available knowledge including social links and attribute sets. Therefore, the prediction
method predicts latent information considering social links and attribute sets collectively
to increase prediction accuracy.
Link knowledge is important for predicting latent information in social networks. There-
fore, we consider uj’ latent information when predicting ui’ latent information, where uj ∈ Ni
and Ni denotes the neighbor set of ui. For clarity, ui with latent attribute lt is denoted as l
i
t.
For brevity, the probability of ui to have latent attribute lt is denoted as P (l
i
t). The
average probability of ui’ neighbors with latent attribute lt is calculated as:
P (lit|Ni) =
1
|Ni|
∑
uj∈Ni
P (ljt ) (4.1)
However, directly computing the average probability may incur overfitting. In practice,
close neighbors should have larger impact for each other on the determination of latent
information. To avoid overfitting, we introduce a weight to evaluate the impact of one
neighbor for target user. We assume that if more published attributes are shared by two
friends, they tend to share more latent attributes. Then the weight Wi,j between ui and uj
is calculated as
Wi,j =
|(xi1, . . . , xim) ∩ (xj1, . . . , xjn)|
|Xi|
(4.2)
Equation (4.2) computes the proportion of the shared attributes between ui and uj
among ui’s attributes. Clearly, Wi,j 6= Wj,i. To determine li based on Ni, we combine
Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2) as follows,
P (lit|Ni) =
1
|Ni|
∑
uj∈Ni
P (ljt )
Wi,j∑
uk∈NiWi,k
(4.3)
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It is easy to find that Equation (4.3) requires that at least one of the neighbors of each
user to publish her latent attributes. Obviously, this strict condition is hard to be satisfied
in real social networks. Therefore, it is inaccurate to predict the latent attributes of user
ui based on link information directly, since it is possible that few neighbors publish their
latent attributes. To solve this problem, we first predict the latent attributes of those unpub-
lished users through analyzing their attribute sets. Then, we predict the latent attributes of
unpublished users through utilizing weighted link knowledge calculated by Equation (4.3).
Next, we present how to predict the latent attributes of a user through analyzing her
attribute set. Given a user ui with attribute set Xi = {x1, . . . , xn} and p potential latent
attributes l1, . . . , lp, the probability of ui with latent attribute lt is arg max
1≤t≤p
[P (lit|x1, . . . , xn)].
To calculate the above value, based on Bayes Theorem, assuming that all attributes are
independent, we have
arg max
1≤t≤p
[
P (lit)× P (x1|lit)× . . .× P (xn|lit)
P (x1, . . . , xn)
]
.
We find that P (x1, . . . , xn) is the same for any value of P (l
i
t). Therefore, we only need
to calculate
arg max
1≤t≤p
[
P (lit)× P (x1|lit)× . . .× P (xn|lit)
]
.
4.3.2 Data Sanitization Method
In Section 4.3.1, we assume powerful adversaries that launch inference attacks by ex-
ploiting social links and attribute sets simultaneously. Therefore, in order to realize the
tradeoff between privacy and utility, our objective is to sanitize both social links and at-
tribute sets.
Attribute-sanitization method An attribute set could be sanitized in three ways,
adding attributes, removing attributes, and perturbing attributes (replace one attribute with
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another). Which methods should be employed to sanitize social data depends on data utility
and privacy metrics and data semantics.
To prevent inference attacks on SLA, we can sanitize the most indicative attributes for
each SLA which is publicly available to adversaries. With this objective, for a user with
attribute set X, it is easy to determine the most indicative attribute xj for any SLA zi ∈ Z
by argmaxj[∀zi ∈ Z : P (xj|zi)].
This allows us to determine a single attribute which is the most indicative for a SLA
and sanitize it. Unfortunately, directly sanitizing the most indicative attributes for SLA can
reduce utility if we don’t consider the most indicative attributes for NSLA. For instance,
consider the case to predict health conditions of users which could be viewed as NSLA.
Health conditions and SLA such as sexual orientation share indicative attribute “gender”.
Therefore, although sanitizing “gender” reduces the prediction accuracy for SLA, it also
reduces the prediction accuracy for NSLA.
To resolve the above conflict, we propose the following data sanitization method: (1) If
there exist indicative attributes shared by SLA and NSLA, we perturb the shared indicative
attributes; and remove the SLA except the shared indicative attributes; (2) If there does not
exist any indicative attribute shared by SLA and NSLA, we remove the indicative attributes
for SLA.
The next challenge is how to perturb the indicative attributes shared by SLA and NSLA.
Our idea is to generalize each shared indicative attribute. For example, if a shared attribute
is idol: Jodon, it can be generalized to basketball star. For each shared indicative attribute,
we can organize potential generalized attributes into a hierarchy.
Link-sanitization method Unlike attributes, social links can only be sanitized by
adding links and removing existing links. Similar with the attribute-sanitization method, a
link-sanitization method should reduce the prediction accuracy for SLA and do not greatly
reduce the prediction accuracy for NSLA. Unfortunately, unlike attributes, it is nontrivial to
find the indicative links shared by SLA and NSLA, thus we focus on reducing the prediction
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accuracy for SLA firstly when sanitize links and more constraints will be given later to
guarantee utility.
For this goal, the concept of Vulnerable Link is introduced as follows:
Definition 4.3.1. Vulnerable link. A vulnerable link of one user is the link whose removal
will lower the prediction accuracy for the SLA of the user. The prediction accuracy for the
SLA of ui upon removing the vulnerable link eij is Λ(Ei − eij).
From the above definition, it shows that Λ(Ei − eij) ≤ Λ(Ei). To protect SLA of ui
through removing links, we first identify a set of vulnerable links denoted as Ai. Second, for
any eij ∈ Ai, we calculate the reduction of prediction accuracy for SLA upon removing eij.
Then, we order the links in Ai according to the calculated prediction accuracy reduction.
We next remove those links with the largest prediction accuracy reduction in Ai.
4.4 Metrics
Now we discuss how to measure utility and latent-data privacy. Our data sanitization
strategy includes two parts: attribute sanitization strategy f(X ′|X) and link sanitization
strategy L(X ′|X). f(X ′|X) likes a transfer function that takes a user’s attribute set X as
input and outputs the sanitized one X ′. Meanwhile, for an arbitrary user ui, L(E ′i|Ei) can
be viewed as a transfer function that takes ui’s link set Ei as input and outputs the sanitized
one E ′i.
4.4.1 Utility metric
For data utility, two aspects need to be considered. First, the sanitized attribute set and
social links should guarantee a SNA server can effectively infer the NSLA of users. Second,
the sanitized network structure should not deviate from the original one very much. Worth
to note that the second aspect expects that sanitizing social links does not distort friendship
relations among users and does not change one’s social status too much. We introduce two
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parameters  and δ to scale the above two aspects. Then, (, δ)-data utility can be defined
as follows.
Definition 4.4.1. (, δ)-Utility. Given social graph G, network disparity measurer M,
collective prediction method C, NSLA set Y , accessible prior knowledge known to third party
users K, we say that G’s sanitized graph G′ satisfies (, δ)-utility if for any NSLA yi ∈ Y ,
(i).M(G,G′) ≤ ;
(ii). ΛyiC (G
′,K)− ΛyiC (K) ≥ δ,
where ΛyiC (G) represents the prediction accuracy of collective prediction method C for NSLA
yi.  is the super-threshold of social structure changes. δ measures how much added pre-
diction accuracy is earned by adversaries through predicting with the published G′. Clearly,
, δ ≥ 0. To preserve data utility, both  and δ are given by the data publisher.
Next, we define utility loss due to the data-sanitization strategy carried out on published
data. Definition 4.4.1 shows that utility loss comes from two aspects: network structure
disparity and prediction accuracy deviation for NSLA. Therefore, utility loss is defined based
on the above two aspects: structure utility loss and prediction utility loss.
Definition 4.4.2. -Structure utility loss. Structure utility loss estimates how much an
arbitrary user ui loses regarding network structure after sanitizing its social links. Structure
utility loss of ui is determined by the structure utility values of ui’s neighbors. For a given
structure utility value metric, the -structure utility loss for ui after sanitizing ui’ vulnerable
link set Ai ⊆ Ni is given by SULi = ζ(SAi) ≤ , where SAi = {Sj|uj ∈ Ai ⊆ Ni, Sj ∈ R∗},
and Sj represents the structure utility value of user uj.
The structure utility value of a user reflects social structure properties, which can be
measured by different metrics. In this paper, we use number of shared friends as structure
utility metric. Unfriending a friend that shares a large of friends of one user has a bad effect
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on the clustering coefficient of the user. Furthermore, we assume ζ(.) is an additive function,
then SULi =
∑
uj∈A⊆Ni Sj ≤ .
Since both attribute set and social links of a user are sanitized and we assume powerful
adversaries predict SLA based on them simultaneously as shown in Section 4.3.1, prediction
utility loss is derived from both of the disparity sources. Since social structure disparity
is measured by -structure utility loss, prediction utility loss only needs to measure the
prediction accuracy deviation derived from attribute sanitization.
To evaluate prediction utility loss due to sanitized attribute set, we introduce an at-
tribute set disparity measurer du, such that du(X,X
′) measures how much prediction utility
loss there is if a SNA server performs analysis depending on X ′ rather than X. Thus, given
ψ(X), f(X ′|X), and du(X,X ′), prediction utility loss can be calculated as the expectation
of du(X,X
′) over all X and X ′ for a user.
Definition 4.4.3. δ-Prediction utility loss. Prediction utility loss estimates the amoun-
t of prediction accuracy deviation for the NSLA of an arbitrary user ui. For a given
attribute set disparity measurer du, the δ-prediction utility loss for ui after carrying out
a data sanitization method on its attribute set X and social links, is given by PULi =∑
X,X′ ψ(X)f(X
′|X)du(X,X ′) ≤ δ.
Attribute set disparity measurer du is determined by data semantics. In different appli-
cations, du can be defined as Euclidean, Hamming, or Mahalanobis distance, etc.
4.4.2 Latent-data privacy metric
We assume powerful adversaries have the knowledge of user’s profile ψ(X) and our data-
sanitization strategy. After obtaining the sanitized attribute set, adversaries calculate the
posterior probability of X, conditional on X ′ with prior knowledge ψ(X) and f(X ′|X):
Pr(X|X ′) = Pr(X,X
′)
Pr(X ′)
=
f(X ′|X)ψ(X)∑
X f(X
′|X)ψ(X)
Then, for each X with posterior probability Pr(X|X ′), adversaries can predict the
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user’s SLA based on X and sanitized social links. We represent the SLA predicted from
Pr(X|X ′) as ZX . Obviously, ZX is related to the sanitized link set A such that we denote
ZX as the function of A, i.e., ZX(A). Adversaries’ goal is then to choose Zˆ to minimize the
user’s conditional expected latent-data privacy, conditional on Pr(X|X ′). For an arbitrary
Zˆ, the user’s conditional expected latent-data privacy is
∑
X Pr(X|X ′)dp(ZX(A), Zˆ), where
dp(ZX(A), Zˆ) is the privacy disparity between ZX(A) and Zˆ.
For the minimized Zˆ, it is
min
Zˆ
∑
X
Pr(X|X ′)dp(ZX(A), Zˆ) (4.4)
The latent-data privacy conditional on a givenX ′ is given by Equation (4.4). Meanwhile,
the probability of X ′ output by the sanitization method is P (X ′) =
∑
X f(X
′|X)ψ(X).
Thus, unconditional expected privacy of the user’s is
∑
X′
ψ(X ′)min
Zˆ
∑
X
Pr(X|X ′)dp(ZX(A), Zˆ)
=
∑
X′
min
Zˆ
∑
X
ψ(X)f(X ′|X)dp(ZX(A), Zˆ)
(4.5)
We define
PX′ = min
Zˆ
∑
X
ψ(X)f(X ′|X)dp(ZX(A), Zˆ). (4.6)
Incorporating PX′ into Equation (4.5), the users unconditional expected privacy is
rewritten as
∑
X′
PX′ , (4.7)
which is the user attempts to maximize by finding the optimal f(X ′|X).
Unfortunately, the minimum operator in Equation (4.6) makes the computation problem
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nonlinear. Therefore, we can transform (4.6) into a series of linear constraints by
PX′ ≤
∑
X
ψ(X)f(X ′|X)dp(ZX(A), Zˆ) ∀Zˆ (4.8)
Therefore, maximizing Formula (4.7) under constraint (4.6) is equal to optimizing For-
mula (4.7) under constraint (4.8).
4.5 Privacy-Utility Tradeoff
In this section, we first formalize optimal problem that can produce optimized data
sanitization strategy. Then, we discuss how to solve the proposed optimal problem. Here, we
introduce function LaPri(.) to measure latent-data privacy with current sanitized attribute
set and social links.
4.5.1 Optimal Problem Formulation
The problem of (, δ)-utility with maximize latent-data privacy can be formulated as
follows.
Definition 4.5.1. (, δ)-UtiOptPri (ψ(.), du(.), dp(.),S, , δ, ). Given user’s profile ψ(.),
attribute set disparity measurer du(.), privacy disparity measure dp(.), structure utility value
metric S, structure utility loss threshold , and prediction utility loss threshold δ, the question
is to find data-sanitization strategy f(.) and link-sanitization strategy L(.), and latent-data
privacy function LaPri(.) such that
1. L(.) satisfies -structure utility loss and f(.) satisfies δ-prediction utility loss;
2. For any L′(.) that satisfies -structure utility loss and f ′(.) that satisfies δ-prediction
utility loss, LaPri(L′(.), f ′(.), ψ(.), dp(.)) ≥ LaPri(L(.), f(.), ψ(.), dp(.)).
The linear optimization program for an arbitrary user ui to find the optimal data sani-
tization strategy is as following: choose f(X ′|X), Zˆ, ∀X,X ′, in order to
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Maximize:
∑
X′
PX′
Subject to:
PX′ ≤
∑
X
ψ(X)f(X ′|X)dp(ZX(A), Zˆ) ∀Zˆ∑
uj∈Ai⊆Ni
Sj ≤ 
∑
X
ψ(X)
∑
X′
f(X ′|X)du(X,X ′) ≤ δ
f(X ′|X) ≥ 0 ∀X,X ′∑
X′
f(X ′|X) = 1, ∀X
4.5.2 Solve the optimal problem
We now solve the optimal problem to find attribute sanitization strategy f(.) and link
sanitization strategy L(.).
Find Link-sanitization Strategy First, we prove the link sanitization method in-
troduced in Section 4.3.2 has monotonicity property. The monotonicity property indicates
that if we increase the number of removed links of a user, we can only improve this user’s
latent-data privacy.
Theorem 4.5.1. Monotonicity. Function LaPri : Ai → R∗ is monotonically nondecreas-
ing, namely, LaPri(Ai∪eij) ≤ LaPri(Ai), where eij ∈ Ai, Ai ∈ Ni, and Ai is the vulnerable
link set of ui.
Proof. As discussed in Definition 4.3.1, the prediction accuracy for user ui’ SLA decreases
upon removing the vulnerable link between ui and uj; namely, for any vulnerable link eij,
Λ(Ai) ≤ Λ(Ai∪eij). This accuracy relation indicates that for user ui, the latent-data privacy
with vulnerable link set Ai is definitely larger than the latent-data privacy with vulnerable
link set Ai ∪ eij. Hence, LaPri(Ai ∪ eij) ≤ LaPri(Ai).
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Theorem 4.5.2. Submodularity. Function LaPri : Ai → R∗ is submodular, namely,
LaPri(Bi∪ eij)−LaPri(Bi) ≤ LaPri(Ai∪ eij)−LaPri(Ai), where Ai ⊆ Bi ⊆ Ni, eij ∈ Ni,
and Ai and Bi are vulnerable link sets of ui.
Proof. For the prediction accuracy for SLA, the maximum decrease in prediction accuracy
of user ui, by removing a vulnerable link eij from vulnerable link set Ai is at least more than
the maximum decrease by removing eij from another set Bi, namely, Λ(Ai ∪ eij)− Λ(Ai) ≤
Λ(Bi ∪ eij)− Λ(Bi), where Ai ⊆ Bi ⊆ Ni, and e ∈ Ni. The accuracy relation indicates that
for user ui, the maximum gain in latent-data privacy after removing vulnerable link eij from
vulnerable link set Ai is at least more than the maximum gain by removing eij from Bi.
Hence, LaPri(Bi ∪ eij)− LaPri(Bi) ≤ LaPri(Ai ∪ eij)− LaPri(Ai).
With Theorem 4.5.1 and Theorem 4.5.2, the problem of finding a link-sanitization strat-
egy is equivalent to the minimization of submodular, nondecreasing, nonnegative function
with constraints that is knapsack-like. The greedy algorithm proposed in [77] could be ex-
ploited to solve this problem with nondecreasing, submodular, nonnegative objective function
constrained by structure utility loss.
Find Attribute-sanitization Strategy To find an attribute-sanitization strategy,
the optimization problem can be solved by iterating over all possible f(X ′|X), all X and
all sanitized X ′ to make sure the prediction accuracy loss of latent-data privacy is less than
δ. Furthermore, find the optimal set of f(X ′|X) that produce minimum value of objective
function
∑
X′ PX′ . However, this approach is impractical since there is an infinite number
of f(X ′|X). For example, X has three possible sanitized attribute vectors X1, X2 and X3,
and the probabilities that satisfy
∑
i=1:3 f(Xi|X) = 1, f(Xi|X) ≥ 0,∀X,Xi are infinite. To
solve this problem, we discrete the probability space, i.e., [0, . . . , 1]→ [0, 1/d, 2/d, . . . , 1] to
get a suboptimal solution. Furthermore, to shrink search space of X, the set of X ′ can be
derived through substituting each attribute in the shared attributes between SLA and NSLA
with a generic attribute, which ensures that adversaries cannot get specific information to
increase prediction accuracy on sensitive attributes, while guarantees no significant accuracy
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Table 4.2. General information about Caltech
Network property Value
Number of users 769
Number of social links 16656
Number of attributes of each user 7
Number of possible attribute values for SLA 4
Number of possible attribute values for NSLA 2
reduction on data utility. Moreover, since there are different levels of generalization, we
organize the generic attributes as a hierarchy.
4.6 Evaluation
4.6.1 Dataset
In our evaluation, we study a large Facebook dataset that contains all the Facebook
“friendship” links among the users at California Institute of Technology at a certain time in
September 2005. It also includes some demographic information like student/faculty status
flag, gender and some other attributes, which are published by users on their Facebook pages.
Each attribute is assigned a numeric value and user identity is ignored. For convenience, the
dataset is named as Caltech. Some general information about Caltech are listed in Table 4.2.
4.6.2 Experimental Settings
As shown in Table 4.2, there are 7 attributes for each user. We choose attribute stu-
dent/faculty status flag (represented by flag) and gender as SLA and NSLA, respectively.
Table 4.2 shows that SLA and NSLA have 4 and 2 possible attribute values, respectively.
The remaining 5 attributes are assumed to be publicly available attributes, among which 3
attributes are for SLA, 3 attributes are for NSLA, and 1 attribute is common.
We compare our data-sanitization strategy with different strategies to satisfy the (, δ)-
UtiOptPri problem defined in Definition 4.5.1: 1) Attribute Removal: remove the most
indicative attributes for SLA; 2) Attribute Perturbing: perturb the most indicative attributes
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for SLA; 3) Link Removal: remove vulnerable links; 4) Random Link Removal: randomly
remove links. We denote our data sanitization strategy as Collective Sanitization since it
collectively harnesses different data sanitization methods.
4.6.3 Privacy-Utility Tradeoff with Different Data-Sanitization Strategies
We evaluate the effectiveness of our Collective Sanitization to realize the privacy-utility
tradeoff. To make a fair comparison, we first evaluate latent-data privacy when the above
five strategies satisfy the same data utility thresholds. We choose an arbitrary pair of 
and δ such as  = 180, δ = 0.4, and then calculate the latent-data privacy under different
strategies with increasing number of attributes and links being sanitized. As stated in
Section 4.3.2, Collective Sanitization sanitizes user attributes by employing removing and
perturbing collectively. The horizontal axis of Fig.4.1(a) for Collective Sanitization represents
the number of the removed attributes (indicative for SLA) and the number of attributes
(common indicative attributes for SLA and NSLA) being perturbed. Similarly, the horizontal
axis of Fig.4.1(b) for Collective Sanitization represents the number of the removed vulnerable
links (as presented in Section 4.3.2).
As shown in Fig.4.1(a), four strategies are generally effective in protecting latent-data
privacy while realizing customized (, δ)-utility. With increasing number of attributes being
sanitized, latent-data privacy monotonically increases as well. However, compared with the
remaining three strategies, Collective Sanitization can realize a larger level of latent-data
privacy with the same number of attributes being sanitized and same utility thresholds.
Meanwhile, as expected, Attribute Removal is better than Attribute Perturbing in protecting
latent-data privacy. With more and more attributes removed and perturbed, this advantage
of Attribute Removal becomes more and more obvious. Furthermore, in protecting latent-
data privacy, Link Removal is better than both Attribute Removal and Attribute Perturbing.
To explain this observation, we find that the latent-data privacy under Link Removal and
Collective Sanitization are close, indicating that removing vulnerable links contributes more
effectiveness than attribute sanitization in protecting latent-data privacy.
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The same observation can be found in Fig.4.1(b), where latent-data privacy monotoni-
cally increases with more and more links removed. However, compared with the remaining
two strategies, Collective Sanitization can also achieve a larger level of latent-data privacy
with the same number of links removed and same utility threshold. Meanwhile, Link Re-
moval is better than Random Link Removal in protecting latent-data privacy. With more
and more links removed, this advantage of Link Removal becomes more and more obvious.
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Figure 4.1. Latent-data privacy under different data-sanitization strategies with increasing
number of (a) attributes; (b) sanitized links,  = 180, and δ = 0.4.
We further discuss the effectiveness of Collective Sanitization in guaranteeing utility
under different levels of latent-data privacy. The results are shown in Fig.4.2, which shows
that utility loss increases with the increasing of latent-data privacy level. Furthermore, utility
loss converges to a stable level with the increasing of latent-data privacy level. The reason
lies that the marginal gain of latent-data privacy is obtained with the maximum number of
sanitized attributes and links, and minimized utility.
4.6.4 Privacy-Utility Tradeoff with Different Prior Knowledge
We evaluate the privacy-utility tradeoff with different cases of prior knowledge for ad-
versaries. We compare our Collective Sanitization assuming most powerful adversaries with
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Figure 4.2. Utility loss under different levels of latent-data privacy: (a) structure utility loss
with different prediction utility loss thresholds and  = 180; (b) prediction utility loss with
different structure utility loss thresholds and δ = 0.4.
the knowledge of user profile ψ(X) and data-sanitization strategy, where different types of
prior knowledge are assumed: 1) Profile Only: only profile is known to adversaries; 2) S-
trategy Only: only data-sanitization strategy is known to adversaries; 3) Unknown Both:
neither profile nor strategy is known to adversaries.
To make a fair comparison, we first compare the latent-data privacy when the above
four cases has same utility thresholds. With the same utility thresholds  = 500 and δ = 0.4,
we calculate the latent-data privacy under different cases with increasing number of sanitized
attributes and links. The results are shown in Fig.4.3(a) and Fig.4.3(b), where the horizontal
axis for Collective Sanitization represents the number of removed/perturbed attributes and
the number of removed vulnerable links, respectively.
Fig.4.3 shows that compared with different cases, Collective Sanitization assuming pow-
erful adversaries is the most effective one in protecting latent-data privacy while guaranteeing
customized (, δ)-utility. As shown in Fig.4.3(a) and Fig.4.3(b), the latent-data privacy un-
der Profile Only and Strategy Only lies somewhere in between Collective Sanitization and
Unknown Both, and profile information is more valuable than strategy information in some
cases. The similar observation can be obtained in Fig.4.3(c) and Fig.4.3(d), where it is al-
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so shown that latent-data privacy converges to a stable level with the increasing of utility
thresholds. The reason lies that the marginal gain of latent-data privacy is obtained with
the most sacrifice in utility.
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Figure 4.3. Latent privacy-utility tradeoff with different cases of prior knowledge for adver-
saries, with increasing number of (a) attributes; (b) sanitized links; and the increasing of (c)
prediction utility threshold; (d) structure utility threshold.
Finally, the latent-data privacy with different utility thresholds is shown in Fig.4.4.
Fig.4.4 shows that with the increasing of  and δ, latent-data privacy increases as well. The
reason lies that it is possible to determine a better data-sanitization strategy with fewer
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utility requirements. Furthermore, latent-data privacy converges to a stable value with
continuously increase of  and δ, which indicates the optimal data-sanitization strategy is
found.
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Figure 4.4. Latent-data privacy with different utility thresholds.
4.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we study how to optimize the tradeoff between latent-data privacy and
customized data utility when combating against powerful adversaries with optimal inference
attacks. To address this issue, we first propose two sanitization methods for links and at-
tributes, based on which we formalize prediction utility loss matric, structure utility loss
matric and latent-data privacy. Then we formulate an optimization problem that can max-
imize latent-data privacy while guaranteeing customized data utility. Finally, we evaluate
our data-sanitization strategy towards real big social network data and the results show that
the proposed data-sanitization strategy can effectively achieve a meaningful privacy-utility
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tradeoff. Our future work is to explore formal privacy models, such as differential privacy or
k-anonimity to balance latent-data privacy and customized data utility.
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Chapter 5
PRIVACY PRESERVING GENOMIC DATA PUBLISHING
5.1 Introduction
The rapid growth of genetic techniques motivates numerous genetic-testing services, in
which DNA-sequencing becomes more and more popular with decreasing cost. Consequently,
an increasing number of individuals (or families) release their genomic data to genetic service
providers, such as 23andMe [78], a DNA genetic testing & analysis provider; OpenSNP
[79], a test result sharing platform; and PatientsLikeMe [80], a disease sharing and research
platform.
Meanwhile, high availability of human genomes have accelerated genomic research in
heralding the diagnosis of hereditary diseases, personalized medicine, or genetic identifica-
tion. Furthermore, individuals can benefit from the research to learn about their genetic
disease predispositions, genetic characteristics of ancestry, and even paternity test results,
using their sequenced genome data. As a consequence, researchers expect more and more
genome data could be collected to pave the way for genomic-orientated services. Individuals
are also inclined to release their genome data to gain benefits from these services.
Although the released genome data bring significant benefits, they also present serious
privacy threats. Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), the most important variants of
DNA among human beings, can provide key information to compute the diseases suscepti-
bility of an individual. For example, GWAS has reported that 3 particular SNPs (rs8034191,
rs2808630 and rs7626795 on chromosomes 15, 1 and 3, respectively) indicate an increasing
susceptibility for lung cancer. Even though genome data are generally anonymized prior
to release, studies have shown that anonymization is not sufficient to preserve privacy [62]
[81]. An individual may incur discrimination risks from, for example, insurance providers or
employers [82].
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Relatives’s genomes are highly correlated. Currently, an individual can release her
genome data through a simple click on a personal computer, without any consent from
her relatives in advance. Consequently, once an individual is identified, even anonymized
genome data would also threaten the privacy of this individual’s relatives. For example,
a controversy is reported regarding the publishing and sequencing of Lacks’s genome data
without any consent from her relatives [83]. The relatives think that their privacy is being
threatened. However, some researchers think that the genetic information has been diluted
because of gene mixing in the reproduction process. In this work, we intend to show that
kin genomic privacy can actually be threatened. We also investigate the necessary effective
tradeoff between data utility and kin genome privacy in order to take full advantage of
genome data.
Publicly available genome association studies help with identifying sensitive information
from the released genome data. For example, GWAS Catalog provides a publicly available
quality controlled collection of GWAS assaying including at least 100,000 SNPs and all the
SNP-trait associations [84]. An SNP-trait association indicates some SNPs (Genotypes) are
associated with some human traits (Phenotypes). Once the genome data releaser is identified,
an attacker can predict possible traits of this releaser and the releaser’s relatives, through
some data mining and machine learning techniques. As a consequence, some individuals
choose to never release any genome data or only release partial genome data. However, those
individuals may still face privacy threats because their relatives may choose to release genome
data. Releasing partial genome data cannot completely protect against inference attacks.
A pertinent example is that, James Watson, co-discover of DNA, shared his whole DNA
sequence to the public, excepting Apolipoprotein E, the significant predictor of Alzheimer’s
disease. However, a recent article [85] shows that, although this sensitive gene is removed, it
can be inferred with the publicly available statistical correlation among SNPs (i.e., linkage
disequilibrium).
In this paper, we first propose an inference attack algorithm to predict target SNPs
and traits based on genome data shared by individuals and SNP-trait associations from
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GWAS Catalog [84]. We then develop a data sanitization method to protect privacy by
sanitizing SNPs and traits prior to releasing while guaranteeing data utility. In our inference
attack algorithm, we incorporate SNPs (known and unknown), traits (known and unknown)
and SNP-trait associations in a factor graph, and then apply belief propagation in this
factor graph to compute the marginal probability of target unknown SNPs and traits. The
previous algorithms generally incur very high computation cost which is proportional to
the number of SNPs of individuals. Considering the number of human’s SNPs is of tens of
millions, it is a big limitation for the existing methods to obtain precise inference results. Our
method achieves linear computation complexity and is more practical for inference attacks.
For our data sanitization method, we first formally define the metrics to evaluate genomic
privacy and data utility. We then introduce noises into SNPs prior to releasing to achieve
a reasonable tradeoff between privacy and utility. Compared with the previous works, our
data-sanitization method can guarantee better privacy-utility tradeoff.
5.2 Preliminaries
In this section, three fundamental concepts are briefly introduced.
5.2.1 Single Nucleotide Polymorphism
A single SNP is a DNA variation between sets of individuals of a species. Such vari-
ation means the difference in a single nucleotide (A, T, C, or G) in the genome between
sets of individuals. For example, the following two DNA fragments from two individuals,
CAGGTCA to CAAGTCA, have a different single nucleotide: G and A. For such a pair of
nucleotides, G and A, or C and T, we say that they are alleles.
Recent studies show that SNPs carry significant information involving the susceptibil-
ity to diseases for human beings. As aforementioned, it is shown that 3 particular SNPs
(rs8034191, rs2808630 and rs7626795 on the chromosomes 15, 1 and 3, respectively) indicate
an increasing susceptibility for lung cancer.
Within a population, two nucleotides (i.e., alleles) on a SNP locus could be distinguished
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as a major allele and a minor allele. A major allele refers to the most common nucleotides
of a given population. A minor allele refers to the rare nucleotides of a given population.
We denote a major allele and minor allele as B and b, respectively.
In alleles, one of the nucleotides on a SNP locus is inherited from father and the other
one is inherited from mother. Therefore, alleles can be denoted as BB (both nucleotides
are major alleles), Bb (a major allele and a minor allele) or bb (both nucleotides are minor
alleles).
5.2.2 Belief Propagation
Belief propagation is a statistical inference algorithm which passes messages in proba-
bilistic graph models, including Bayesian networks, factor graphs and Markov random fields.
It is generally used to calculate Marginal Probability Distribution (MPD) for target unknown
variables, conditional on known ones. Belief propagation is generally described by the op-
erations in factor graphs (a Bayesian network and Markov random field can be transformed
to a factor graph). A factor graph is undirected, which contains two disjoint types of nodes:
variable nodes and factor nodes. There is an edge between a factor node and a variable
node iff this variable node is an argument of the factor node. In belief propagation, each
variable node (factor node) passes messages to its neighbor factor nodes (variable nodes).
The propagated message is the probability (belief) of a variable node being a value (such as 1
(0) representing the presence (absence) of a trait). Given certain initial states and boundary
conditions, belief propagation is to propagate messages until the unknown variables converge
to the boundary conditions.
5.2.3 GWAS Catalog
GWAS can be used to identify the SNPs associated with human’s traits, by splitting
individuals in a given population into case groups and control groups. GWAS has identified
the SNPs associated with many human traits and diseases, including lung cancer, Chronic
kidney disease, height, cervical cancer, type-2 diabetes, etc.
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GWAS Catalog is a publicly available report of GWAS which presents all the SNP-
trait associations. The analysis of massive variation across human genomes in case-control
studies can also distinguish two nucleotides in a SNP locus as: risk allele and non-risk allele.
A risk allele refers to the most common nucleotide of the individuals in a case group (i.e.,
individuals present a target trait). Accordingly, the other nucleotide in a SNP locus is
referred as a non-risk allele.
In the context of GWAS studies, another parameter reported by GWAS Catalog is odds
ratio of a nucleotide K, which refers to the ratio of the odds of traits for individuals having
K and the odds of traits for individuals who do not have K.
5.3 Problem Formulation
5.3.1 Genomic Data Model
All SNPs in the DNA sequence of an individual is denoted by S (|S| = n). The genotype
of SNP S is denoted by si with si ∈ S and si ∈ {BB,Bb, bb} (as defined in Section 5.2.1).
We assume target individuals or familial members release complete or partial genome data
to the public, and the target sensitive part is not released for privacy concerns. The publicly
available SNPs of target individual is defined as SK , while the unknown part is defined as
SU .
In an SNP-trait association, we represent the collected traits for target family by T . For
each trait tj ∈ T , the set of associated SNPs is denoted by Stj . For each si ∈ Stj , the risk
allele of si is denoted by r
j
i , and the odds ratio of r
j
i is denoted by O
j
i . GWAS also reports the
risk-allele frequency (RAF) in a control group which is expressed by f ji
o
. Although GWAS
does not report the RAF in the case group (denoted by f ji
a
), we can obtain it from f ji
o
and Oji [49]. Similarly, the released traits by familial members are defined by TK and the
unreleased ones are denoted as TU .
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5.3.2 Attacker Model
An attacker intends to predict target traits and SNPs of target individuals, i.e., XU =
TU ∪ SU . We assume the attacker is relatively powerful with broad background knowledge:
(i) the released SNPs from the target individual and the relatives (if any) (i.e., SK), (ii)
the traits shared by the individual and her relatives (if any) (i.e., TK), and (iii) SNP-trait
association and auxiliary information (i.e., C(T, si, rji , Oji , f ji
o
)).
5.3.3 Problem Definition
The studied problem can be formally defined as follows:
Input:
(1) individual released SNPs SK , released traits TK , and SNP/trait association
C(T, si, rji , Oji , f ji
o
).
(2) Privacy threshold δ.
Output:
Inference algorithm for predicting Xu.
Privacy preserving genome data releasing method achieving tradeoff between privacy
and data utility.
5.4 Inference Attacks
For the above problem, the inference attacks on target SNPs and traits could be formu-
lated as calculating their Marginal Probability Distribution (MPD).
With this objective, we first calculate the joint probability distribution of the target
unknown variables, i.e., p(XU |SK , TK , C), where XU = TU ∪ SU .
Then, the marginal probability distribution of a target variable xi ∈ XU can be obtained:
p(xi|SK , TK , C) =
∑
XU\xi
p(XU |SK , TK , C) (5.1)
where XU\xi is to sum over all the variables in XU except xi.
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In Equation (5.1), the number of the terms exponentially increases with the number of
the variables in XU . Considering human’s DNA sequences contain tens of million of SNPs
as well as massive potential traits, it is impossible to predict target variables by computing
marginal probability distribution directly. Our solution is to factorize the joint probability
distribution of target variables into sets of local distributions, with each one taking a subset
of variables as arguments. Conducting such a transformation is challenging since we need to
identify proper local functions and their arguments from massive SNPs and traits.
To address this issue, we model known variables, unknown variables, and SNP-trait as-
sociations as a probability graph, and then apply belief propagation to calculate the marginal
probability distribution of target variables. In this way, the calculation of marginal prob-
ability distribution is transformed from an exponential complexity problem into a linear
complexity problem.
A factor graph is a probability graph model containing two types of nodes: variable
nodes and factor nodes. A SNP variable node represents a known or unknown SNP, and a
trait variable node represents a potential known or unknown trait. A factor node represents
an SNP-trait association.
Variable nodes and factor nodes are connected in the following way: SNP variable node
si and trait variable node tj are connected to factor node fji if si is associated with trait tj.
Fig.5.1 shows a simple example with 3 trait variables T = {t1, t2, t3} and 5 SNP vari-
ables S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}. From Fig. 5.1, we observe that {s1, s2}, {s2, s3, s4}, {s5} are
associated with t1, t2 and t3, respectively.
By applying belief propagation in a factor graph, p(XU |SK , TK , C) could be factorized
into sets of local distributions and each one takes a subset of variables (SNPs and traits) as
arguments:
p(XU |SK , TK , C) = 1
Z
∏
i∈S
∏
j∈T
fji(si, tj, C) (5.2)
where Z ia a normalization factor.
We now investigate the rationality of Equation (5.2). As introduced in Section 5.2.2,
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t3 
f11 f21 f22 f32 f42 f53 
Figure 5.1. A factor graph with 3 traits T = {t1, t2, t3} and 5 SNPs S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}.
belief propagation performs inference on probability graphical models by passing messages
from variable nodes and factor nodes, and from factor nodes to variable nodes. Two pa-
rameters are introduced, µ and λ. µ represents the massages from a variable node (si
or tj) to a factor node. λ represents the massages from a factor node to a variable n-
ode. To describe the message-passing process, we take nodes t2 and s1, factor node f21 in
Fig.5.1 as an example. Massage µ
(n)
v→f (s1
(n)) from s1 to f21 represents the probability of
s1 = κ (κ = BB,Bb, bb) in the n-th iteration. Message λ
(n)
f→v(s1
(n)) from f21 to s1 repre-
sents the probability of s1 = κ (κ = BB,Bb, bb) in the n-th iteration, given the trait/SNP
associations.
A variable node v passes massage to its neighbor factor node f by multiplying all
messages passed from its neighbor factor nodes except f . Taking the factor graph in Fig.5.1
as an example, the message from s1 to f21 (denoted as s→ f) is:
µ
(n)
s→f (s1
(n)) =
1
Z
×
∏
f∗∈N(s1)\f21
λ
(n−1)
f∗→s (s1
(n−1)) (5.3)
where N(s1)\f21 includes all the neighbor factor nodes of s1 except f21 (in Fig.5.1,
N(s1)\f21 = {f11}).
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Similarly, variable node t2 sends message to factor node f21 (denoted as t→ f):
µ
(n)
t→f (t2
(n)) =
1
Z
×
∏
f∗∈N(t2)\f21
λf∗→t(t2(n−1)) (5.4)
where N(t2)\f21 = {f22, f23}.
Then, from belief propagation, factor node f sends message to neighbor variable node v
by multiplying all the massages from the neighbors of f except v, and multiplies the obtained
product with the factor. It then sums all the neighbor variable nodes of f except v. The
massage from f21 to variable node s1 (denoted as f → s) is
λ
(n)
f→s(s1
(n)) =
∑
t2
f21(s1, t2)
∏
v∗∈N(f21)\s1
µ
(n)
v∗→f (v
∗) (5.5)
where f21(s1, t2) ∝ p(s1|t2) and we will discuss its computation in the following part.
Similarly, the message passing from f21 to variable node t2 (denoted as f → t) is
λ
(n)
f→t(t2
(n)) =
∑
s1
f21(s1, t2)
∏
v∗∈N(f21)\t2
µ
(n)
v∗→f (v
∗) (5.6)
where f21(s1, t2) ∝ p(t2|s1) and we will discuss its computation in the following part.
We now show the initial state and termination condition in a massage-passing iteration.
In the initial iteration (i.e., n = 1), variable nodes first pass massage to factor nodes. Variable
node si ∈ SU begins passing massage to its neighbor factor nodes. We set µ(1)s→f (si(1)) = 1
for each potential value of si (i.e., µ
(1)
s→f (si
(1) = BB) = 1, µ
(1)
s→f (si
(1) = Bb) = 1, µ
(1)
s→f (si
(1) =
bb) = 1). On the other hand, for any SNP variable node si ∈ SK with known value si = κ,
we set µ
(1)
s→f (si
(1) = κ) = 1 and µ
(1)
s→f (x
i
j
(1)
= κ′) = 0 for other potential SNP values κ′,
κ′ ∈ {{BB,Bb, bb}\κ}.
The massages passing from tj ∈ TU to its neighbor factor nodes follows the same rule.
Until all the massages are converged (i.e., the values of µ and λ never change), the iteration
is finished. Finally, the MPD of each unknown variable xi ∈ XU is obtained by multiplying
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Table 5.1. Conditional probability of risk allele rji and non-risk allele ρ
j
i , given one of
neighbor factor nodes tj of si
tj t¯j
rji f
j
i
a
f ji
o
ρji 1− f ji
a
1− f ji
o
Table 5.2. Genotype probability of rji r
j
i , r
j
i ρ
j
i and ρ
j
iρ
j
i , given one of si’ neighbor factor
nodes tj
tj t¯j
rji r
j
i
√
f ji
a
√
f ji
o
rji ρ
j
i f
j
i
a
(1− f ji
a
) f ji
a
(1− f ji
o
)
ρjiρ
j
i
√
1− f ji
a
√
1− f ji
o
all the massages passed to xi.
As indicated in Equations (5.5) and (5.6), to formulate the message content in each
iteration, we need to calculate the conditional probability of traits and SNPs. Firstly, the
prevalence rate of each trait p(tj) can be viewed as prior knowledge, which can be collected
from public organizations such as CDC [86]. Then, since it is non-trivial to deduce the prob-
ability of SNP si conditioned on an associated trait, we calculate the conditional probability
of the nucleotide of a SNP locus. As introduced in Section 5.2.3, two nucleotides are distin-
guished in a SNP locus as: risk allele and non-risk allele. Table 5.1 shows the probability of
RAF and nRAF conditioned on an associated trait, respectively.
Based on the conditional probability of RAF and nRAF, we go back to calculate the
probability of SNP conditioned on an associated trait. Given allele rji and allele ρ
j
i , the
genotype of si associated by trait tj can be one of the following: r
j
i r
j
i , r
j
i ρ
j
i and ρ
j
iρ
j
i . There-
fore, the genotype frequency can be easily obtained by simply transforming Table 5.1. The
resultant table is shown in Table 5.2. Similarly, the trait probability conditioned on an SNP
to which it associates can be easily deduced from Table 5.2 based on Bayesian posterior
probability.
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5.5 Tradeoff between Privacy and Utility
In this section, we present a data-sanitization method to achieve a reasonable tradeoff
between privacy and utility by introducing noises to SNPs prior to releasing. The data
sanitization method is expected to effectively defense against inference attacks on target
sensitive SNPs and traits, as well as to guarantee data utility. With this goal, we first define
the metrics for evaluating privacy and utility loss with noises introduced into SNPs.
5.5.1 Metrics for Privacy and Utility
If the sanitized data can prevent attackers to learn sensitive information, generally, such
sanitization can effectively protect privacy. We define privacy in terms of the ambiguity level
of inference results. Specifically, we expect that the larger uncertainty of an attacker, the
higher the privacy preservation level.
We use the entropy of p(xi|SK , TK , C) to evaluate the uncertainty of inference results
from an attacker:
Hi =
−∑xi p(xi|SK , TK , C) log p(xi|SK , TK , C)
log(3)
(5.7)
where xi is either a target SNP (xi ∈ {BB,Bb, bb}) or a trait (xi ∈ {0, 1}). The larger the
entropy, the larger the ambiguity of p(xi|SK , TK , C). Then, parameter δ is introduced to
bound Hi as a privacy metric:
Definition 5.5.1. δ-privacy. The released SNPs satisfy δ-privacy if Hi ≥ δ for each SNP
si.
For data utility, it is expected that as many actual SNPs as possible are released, while
guaranteeing δ-privacy.
Definition 5.5.2. Utility. The utility of a set of SNPs is measured by the expected number
of released SNPs.
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5.5.2 Data-Sanitization Method
To defense against inference attacks on xi, we propose to sanitize the neighbor SNPs of
xi. The neighbor SNPs of a trait and an SNP are defined as follows:
Definition 5.5.3. Neighbor SNPs of a trait. The neighbor SNPs of trait tj are those
SNPs which:
1. are directly associated with tj.
2. are associated with the traits sharing common SNPs with tj.
3. share common traits with the SNP in Case 2.
For example, all three SNPs s1, s2 and s3 are neighbor SNPs of t1 in Fig.5.1, as s2
and s3 are associated with t2 that shares s1 with t1 (satisfying Case 2). Furthermore, if s3
and another SNP s4 are associated with another trait t3, s4 is also the neighbor SNP of t1
(satisfying Case 3).
Similarly, the neighbor SNPs of an SNP is defined as follows:
Definition 5.5.4. Neighbor SNPs of an SNP. The neighbor SNPs of SNP si are those
SNPs which:
1. are associated with a same trait with si.
2. are associated with the traits associated with the SNPs in Case 1.
3. share common traits with the SNP in Case 2.
For example, s2 and s3 are neighbor SNPs of s1, as they are associated with same trait
t2 with s1. Furthermore, if s3 and another SNP s4 are associated with another trait t3, s4 is
also the neighbor SNP of s1 (satisfying Case 2).
To achieve the tradeoff between privacy and utility, we expect the set of neighbor SNPs
of each xi can be identified so that sanitizing them can maximize data utility while satisfying
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the privacy preservation constraint. For this purpose, the concept of vulnerable neighbor SNP
is introduced:
Definition 5.5.5. Vulnerable neighbor SNP. The vulnerable neighbor SNP of xi is a
neighbor SNP of xi, whose sanitizing will decrease the prediction accuracy on xi.
Since sanitized released SNPs through the perturbing method (i.e., replace an actual
SNP with another one) may generate uncontrollable results when making genetic analysis,
we choose to sanitize SNPs through the removing method. The privacy of xi upon removing
its vulnerable neighbor SNP xk is Hi(Ni − xk), where Ni is the neighbor SNPs of xi.
With Definition 5.5.5, the problem of achieving Genome Privacy-Utility Tradeoff (G-
PUT) can be formally stated as follows:
Definition 5.5.6. GPUT(SK , TK , SU , TU , C, δ). Given known SNPs XK, known traits TK,
statistical information from GWAS Catalog C, and privacy threshold δ, how to identify the
minimum number of SNPs to sanitize so that the sanitized SNPs guarantee each trait in TU
and each SNP in SK satisfy δ-privacy.
To solve the problem, we first prove the ambiguity of inference results, i.e., Equation
(5.7) has the monotonicity and submodularity properties, when the increasing number of
SNPs are sanitized. The monotonicity property means that if we sanitize more SNPs, we
can only improve privacy.
Theorem 5.5.1. Monotonicity. The privacy function of an arbitrary variable xi ∈ XU ,
Hi : Ni → R∗ is monotonically nondecreasing, i.e., Hi(Ni∪ sk) ≤ Hi(Ni), where sk ∈ Ni and
Ni is the set of vulnerable neighbor SNPs of xi.
Proof: As mentioned in Definition 5.5.5, the prediction accuracy on xi decreases upon
sanitizing vulnerable neighbor SNPs, which implies that Λ(Ni) ≤ Λ(Ni∪sk) for any vulnera-
ble neighbor SNP xk. Obviously, the above inequation indicates that for any xi, the privacy
with neighbor SNPs Ni is definitely larger than the privacy with neighbor SNPs Ni ∪ xk,
namely, Hi(Ni ∪ sk) ≤ Hi(Ni).
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Theorem 5.5.2. Submodularity. The privacy function of an arbitrary variable xi ∈ XU ,
Hi : Ni → R∗ has the submodularity property, i.e., Hi(Ui∪sk)−Hi(Ui) ≤ Hi(Vi∪sk)−Hi(Vi),
where Ui ⊆ Vi ⊆ Ni, sk ∈ Ni, and Ui and Vi are the sets of vulnerable neighbor SNPs of xi.
Proof For an arbitrary variable xi ∈ XU , the maximum decrease in prediction accuracy
on xi, by sanitizing a vulnerable neighbor SNP sk from vulnerable neighbor SNPs Vi is at
least more than the maximum decrease by removing sk from another set Ui, namely, Λ(Vi ∪
sk)− Λ(Vi) ≤ Λ(Ui ∪ sk)− Λ(Ui), where Vi ⊆ Ui ⊆ Ni, and sk ∈ Ni. The accuracy relation
indicates that for xi, the maximum gain in privacy after removing vulnerable neighbor SNP
sk from vulnerable neighbor SNPs Vi is at least more than the maximum gain by removing
sk from Ui. Hence, Hi(Ui ∪ sk)−Hi(Ui) ≤ Hi(Vi ∪ sk)−Hi(Vi).
Theorem 5.5.1 and Theorem 5.5.2 show that the problem of finding an SNP sanitiza-
tion method is transformed to the minimization of submodular, nondecreasing, nonnegative
function with constraints that is knapsack-like. Then, we can utilize the greedy algorithm
proposed in [77] to solve this problem.
5.6 Evaluation
5.6.1 Datasets
In our evaluation, we construct a factor graph relying on the trait/SNP associations
provided by GWAS Catalog, as discussed in Section 5.2.3 and Section 5.4. Then, we evaluate
our inference method on trait and SNPs and the data-sanitization method towards the Age-
related macular degeneration (AMD) dataset. AMD is a degeneration of eye’s macula,
which generally leads to vision loss for elder people. As a chronic disease, AMD is caused
by a combination of genetic defect and environmental factors. The AMD dataset contains
genotypes of 90449 SNPs from 96 cases and 50 controls [?].
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Table 5.3. Seven other popular diseases and the corresponding prevalence rates
Disease Prevalence rate
Alzheimer’s Disease 0.0167
Celiac Disease 0.0075
Heart Diseases 0.115
Hypertensive disease 0.29
Liver carcinoma 0.000017
Osteoporosis 0.103
Stomach Carcinoma 0.00025
5.6.2 Experiment Setting
Since the AMD dataset only contains the case/control groups involving the AMD dis-
ease, for our evaluation, we choose 7 other popular diseases and assume each individual
has each disease with disease prevalence rate. The chosen diseases and the corresponding
prevalence rates are shown in Table 5.3.
By searching from GWAS Catalog, the corresponding associated SNPs and parameters
can be identified for each disease. Then, the factor graph involving these diseases and
associated SNPs can be constructed.
As a comparison, we introduce the estimation error of an attacker for target traits and
SNPs as another privacy metric, and the estimation error of an attacker in predicting xi is
defined as:
Er =
∑
xi
p(xi|SK , TK , C)‖xi − xˆi‖ (5.8)
where xˆi is the predicted result by an attacker.
5.6.3 Experiment Results
We show the evolution of trait privacy level with the increasing number of sanitized SNPs
in Fig.5.2. It shows that our prediction method has a better accuracy performance. When
no SNPs are removed, our inference method has larger entropy (less attacker uncertainty)
and lower estimation error compared with that of naive Bayes. Furthermore, to maximize
attacker uncertainty (i.e., entropy error value approximates to 1), our inference method
requires removing more SNPs.
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Figure 5.2. Privacy level with increasing number of sanitized SNPs: (a) belief propagation;
(b) Naive Bayes, as a prediction method.
5.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an inference attack algorithm which can predict the genotypes
and traits of individuals with linear computation complexity, based on publicly available
genome data and traits released by individuals or their relatives. We also propose an SNP-
sanitization method to achieve the tradeoff between genomic data privacy and utility, by
introducing noises to genome data to be released. The proposed reconstruction method
can efficiently launch inference attacks for high-dimensional genomic data, relying on factor
graphs and belief propagation. To develop such a method, we first introduce the metrics to
evaluate utility and privacy based on data availability and attacker uncertainty. With the
defined metrics, proper SNPs can be sanitized to satisfy the privacy protection budget with
less utility loss.
87
Chapter 6
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
6.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Collection and Processing for the Internet of
Things
The privacy challenges raised by IoT are critical to address as they have implications
on basic rights and our collective ability to trust the Internet and the devices that connect
to it. Generally, privacy concerns are amplified by the way in which the IoT expands the
feasibility and reach of surveillance and tracking.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming more and more widespread, which has led to
increasing volume of sensory data. As estimated by the IDC, by 2020, more than 212 billion
sensors will be connected worldwide and 44 zettabytes of data will be generated. With the
development of big data techniques, certainly, clients daily life will also benefit from such
incomprehensible sensory data. Therefore, emerging data techniques are expected to extract
valuable information from such big multi-modal sensory data.
However, the emerging privacy scandals reminder clients must demand better privacy
and security preservations that protect them against data breaches, inference attacks, cor-
porate surveillance, etc. Therefore, how to conduct privacy preserving data collection and
processing for the IoT with significant data utility, is becoming increasingly stringent.
Although several methodologies have been developed for addressing this issue; however,
three key challenges are still demanding new techniques: 1) Analyzing how the potential
strategies taken by the IoT server and the clients to guarantee better tradeoff between IoT
privacy and data utility 2) Theory and practice of designing privacy proxy to outsource
the management of privacy preference expressing, regulating and enforcing. 3) Privacy
preserving aggregation on big IoT data.
The first challenge mainly derives from the high dimensional property of IoT data, the
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complex data correlation, and the potential auxiliary knowledge of attacker. In collecting
high-dimensional data with privacy guarantee, large scale of noise is generally required to be
injected, because of output salability and signal-to-noise ratio [1]. Furthermore, the complex
data correlation and auxiliary knowledge among multi-modal data presents significant chal-
lenges in protecting against inference attacks. To address issue, I propose to incorporate such
high-dimensional data, correlation and auxiliary information into a probabilistic graphical
model (such as factor graph), and then approximate the high-dimensional distribution of
the IoT data with a set of well-chosen low-dimensional distributions; then, noise for specific
privacy guarantee can be injected into them.
The second challenge mainly derived from large number of devices in modern IoT. To
rescue clients from such a heavy burden of expressing, regulating and enforcing privacy
preferences, I propose to develop a privacy proxy based on game theory. Since such a proxy
is honest-and-curious so that we propose to identify a privacy proxy from the game playing
among attacker, clients and proxy.
The third challenge mainly derived from the big data property of IoT data. How to
effectively obtain complex aggregation results with specific privacy guarantee from big IoT
data is challenging, such as range counting, quantiles, etc. For example, to guarantee the
differential privacy (viewed as the formal privacy definition), the sensitivity of aggregation
functions is generally very high in IoT. To address this issues, we propose to lower the
sensitivity of functions with sampling and data combinations.
It is my belief and a key motivation for the future research interests that, to properly
protect privacy in an IoT application, one must make available two different toolsets:
6.1.1 Toolset 1: Enable Users to Express, Regulate and Enforce Their Pri-
vacy Preferences
For a client, there must be a toolset for him/her to properly express, regulate, and
enforce their privacy preferences involving a large number of IoT devices. It is important for
the client to determine how much he/she values his/her private data and, in turn, whether
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the benefit of an IoT application outweighs the sacrifice on privacy. Given many clients’
lack of expertise on understanding the implications of disclosing private information, it is
imperative to have a toolset that helps a client with the proper valuation of private data
and determining whether to share it to enable an IoT application. Moreover, since privacy
preferences are generally evolving dynamically, it is imperative to have a toolset that helps
clients to regulate their preferences autonomously. Most importantly, such toolset can help
clients to put their preferences into effect.
6.1.2 Toolset 2: Understand the Tradeoff between Service Quality and Pri-
vacy guarantees
For a server, there must be a toolset for it to understand the tradeoff between service
quality and privacy guarantees. After all, it is the job of the server to return to clients
the benefit of an IoT application, so as to justify the collection of private information. A
reputable company may be willing to provide a consumer-friendly privacy policy - but this
cannot come at a significant expense of the service quality offered by the IoT application.
Thus, there must be a toolset available for the server to properly evaluate the tradeoff
between privacy guarantees and the resulting loss of quality of service; and to devise optimal
strategies that preserve service quality given potentially wide ranges of privacy preferences
of different clients.
6.1.3 Interesting Problems
Here are some examples of problems I find interesting:
• Theory and practice of designing privacy proxy to outsource the management of privacy
preference expressing, regulating and enforcing.
• Big data mining methodology over multi-modal IoT data to reconstruct detailed pro-
files of clients.
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• Analyzing how the potential strategies taken by the server and the clients play out
with each other - specifically, the implications of such strategies on the effectiveness of
IoT applications and the client privacy.
• Dynamic and distributed IoT data publishing with privacy and utility guarantee.
• Privacy preserving IoT data mining.
6.2 Differentially Private Algorithms for Big Data Aggregation
The proliferation and ever-increasing capabilities of mobile devices such as smart phones
give rise to a variety of mobile sensing applications, and also produce a large amount of
sensory data. How to effectively extract useful information from such mass data, such as
performing business analysis, identifying frequent patterns, releasing data statistics, etc,
is becoming more and more valuable and imperative, with sensory data being collected,
analyzed, and disseminated in a massive scale.
Although aggregation statistics computed from sensory data are very useful, in many
scenarios, the data from users are privacy-sensitive, and users do not trust any single third-
party aggregator to see their data values. Fortunately, differential privacy, the state-of-the-
art paradigm can be used to address the balance between data utility and privacy in data
aggregation, which requires that the data released reveals little information about whether
any particular individual is present or absent from the data. However, the most significant
challenges is, to implement differential privacy over big data (general high-dimensional), the
amount of noise injected in data has to be very high.
Therefore, it is my belief and a key motivation for the future research interests that, to
properly protect privacy in big data aggregation, one must address the following issues first:
• Differentially private algorithms for constructing data aggregation over high-dimensional
domain.
• Approaches to reduce the sensitivity in data aggregation.
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• Privacy preserving deep learning method to assist data aggregation.
6.3 Privacy Preserving Genomic Data Publishing
A key challenge for developing privacy preserving genomic data publishing is how to
deal with high computational complexity brought by the massive genomes and human trait-
s, as well as complex association in human’s genetic information. As shown by the dbSNP
database, the largest public SNP repository [87], includes over 50 million human SNPs,
encoding the most common type of genetic variation among people. Meanwhile, statisti-
cal data form NIH in 2010 shows that there are more than 6,000 genetic disorders known.
Genome-Wide Association Study of different type of human traits (i.e., case-control study)
can be publicly accessed in dbGaP [88], which offers the genetic information of case group
population and control group population. For example, we can collect Age-related macular
degeneration (AMD) dataset from dbGaP. AMD is a degeneration of eye’s macula, which
generally leads to vision loss for elder people. As a chronic disease, AMD is caused by a com-
bination of genetic defect and environmental factors. The AMD dataset reported genotypes
of 90449 SNPs from 96 cases and 50 controls. For such massive SNPs and traits, SNP-trait
association shows the susceptibility of an individual to several diseases can be computed
from his SNPs. The GWAS Catalog published a vast amount of data, encompassing over
38,000 SNP-trait associations from more than 2,800 publications as of May 2017 [89]. More-
over, DNA sequences are highly correlated, leading to interdependent privacy risks. Linkage
disequilibrium is a correlation that appears between any pair of SNP positions in the whole
genome due to the population’s genetic history. Such genetic information can be accessed in
[87]. For example, the CEPH/Utah Pedigree 1463 that contains the partial DNA sequences
of 17 family members. Therefore, protecting individual privacy with privacy guarantee is
challenging.
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